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INTRODUCTION 
There is not and never will be a “field theory” of international law 
and relations that succeeds in explaining individual or state conduct 
so completely as to permit the reliable prediction of specific state 
actions that will occur in distant, concrete circumstances.  We cannot 
know whether the conditions necessary for cooperation will be 
present in the future, or how states will respond to the conditions that 
do exist.1 
 
So opined Professor Michael J. Glennon in his recent article 
How International Rules Die.2  Given the messy reality of 
international relations, Glennon argues that we can never really know 
why states follow rules of international law, which is true enough.3  
We cannot enter into the minds of the policymakers.  We can never 
know with absolute certainty why decision makers chose to sign, 
ratify, and follow the provisions of international legal regimes.  But if 
international relations theory is to serve any useful purpose, it must 
seek to make some kind of evaluation—even if it is a contingent, 
imperfect one—of why states act as they do.  Without such 
evaluation, there can be no framework for understanding the 
behavior of international actors and no guidance for policymakers. 
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 1. Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L. J. 939, 988 (2005). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
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We believe that the problem lies not so much in the general 
project of political science, but rather in the nature of existing 
theories of international relations and international law.  Each of the 
major theories—structural realism, modified structuralism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, and constructivism—offers some insights into state 
behavior, but none is able to provide a comprehensive framework for 
understanding state behavior regarding international legal regimes.  
What is needed is a better theory, and that is what we have sought to 
formulate. 
To respond to the failure of existing theories, we have developed 
a new theory that we refer to as the “positional theory of adherence.”  
This theory provides a much stronger basis for understanding why 
states adhere to international legal regimes.  This positional theory 
has been developed inductively through an examination in which we 
explore the participation of nineteen global and regional powers in 
four prominent treaty regimes: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), the Land Mine Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.  Based on 
this examination, we conclude that the most significant determinants 
of behavior are the position of that state in the international system as 
well as the nature of the treaty regime, the extent to which the regime 
infringes on state sovereignty, the nature of verification/enforcement 
arrangements of that regime, and the normativity of the treaty 
regime. 
This Article seeks to lay out the nature of our empirical study 
and to set forth the basic elements of this new theory.  Part I develops 
the concept of “adherence” and explore insights from traditional 
international relations theory and international legal theory relating 
to adherence.  Part II discusses the methodology used in our 
investigation, including the case and country selection.  Part III then 
provides a detailed examination of the motivations given by these 
states for adherence with respect to the four treaties.  Concluding that 
traditional theories by themselves fail to predict adherence, Part IV 
lays out the contours of our positional theory of adherence.  Finally, 
Part V examines the implications of this theory for foreign 
policymaking. 
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I.  ADHERENCE THEORY 
A. The Concept of Adherence 
Many international legal and relations scholars4 have written 
about the concept of “compliance.”5  Compliance is meant to reflect 
the actions of a state to follow the provisions of a particular treaty or 
rule of customary international law.6  A state is said to be complying 
with a treaty or rule of customary international law if it is acting in 
accordance with the legal obligations established in that particular 
source of law.  But state participation in an international legal regime 
is actually more complex.  For example, the United States decided in 
1982 to neither sign, nor ratify the Law of the Sea Convention,7 but to 
abide by it in part.8  President Reagan announced in 1983 that the 
United States would accept and abide by the provisions of the 
Convention dealing with “traditional uses of the ocean” including 
navigation over-flight vis-à-vis other states that agree to follow those 
provisions.9  Reagan’s primary reservation was with regard to the 
 
 4. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS passim (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1995) (developing a theory of compliance); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS passim (Clarendon Press 1995); Claire R. Kelly, 
Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 303 (2005); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)); Beth A. 
Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 
YALE J. INT’L L. 323 passim (2000); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of 
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 passim (2002).  See also ANTHONY CLARK AREND, 
LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY passim (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); Anthony 
Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 107 passim (1998). 
 5. Professor William Bradford has argued that there is a growing “subfield” of 
international law that addresses the issue of compliance.  William Bradford, International Legal 
Compliance: Surveying the Field, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 495 passim (2005). 
 6. Kal Raustiala notes that “[c]ompliance generally refers to a state of conformity or 
identity between an actor’s behavior and specified rule.”  Kal Raustiala, Compliance & 
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 391 
(2000). 
 7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]. 
 8. Much has been written on the United States and the 1982 Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.  See generally ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW OCEANS REGIME 
(Univ. of S.C. Press 1993) (providing general background information on the Law of the Sea 
Convention); THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA (Bernard Oxman et al. eds., Inst. 
for Contemp. Studies 1983). 
 9. In his statement released on March 10, 1983, Reagan explained that “the United States 
will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the [Law of 
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provisions for deep sea bed mining (Part XI),10 which he did not 
consider to be customary law.  His policy adhered to most but not all 
of the Law of the Sea Convention, suggesting the non-binary nature 
of participation in an international legal regime. 
Given this non-binary nature of participation and the 
problematic implications of the term “compliance,” a better word to 
describe the relationship between a state and a treaty regime—or rule 
of customary international law—might be “adherence.”  
“Adherence,” as the term is used here, means the level of 
participation of a state in the treaty regime.  Adherence is not a 
binary concept.11  There is a spectrum along which participation in a 
regime takes place.  States may sign a treaty, ratify, fulfill the 
provisions in varying degrees, and demonstrate varying degrees of 
commitment to the treaty based in part on their institutional 
investment, participation in the regime, and advocacy.  They may also 
sign or ratify as an expression of commitment, but not effect real 
changes in their behavior.12  States may even fail to sign or ratify, yet 
exhibit some level of adherence to provisions of the agreement.  Any 
state, at a given point in time, will fall somewhere along the spectrum 
of adherence.  By examining a variety of indicators, a general 
evaluation of the level of adherence of that state can be determined. 
In order to develop a new theory of adherence, it is necessary to 
look at the reasons why states engage in these different levels of 
participation.  From a theoretical and empirical perspective, what 
factors affect states’ decisions to participate along this spectrum?  A 
good starting point for this evaluation of state behavior and 
 
the Sea] Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under 
international law are recognized by such coastal states.”  United States Ocean Policy, 19 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383-84 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
 10. Law of the Sea Convention, pt. XI (establishing a legal regime for the mining of deep 
seabed nodules). 
 11. Using the term compliance, Chayes and Chayes clearly recognize this problem: 
Compliance is not an on-off phenomenon.  For a straightforward prohibitory norm like 
a highway speed limit, it is in principle a simple matter to determine whether any 
particular driver is in compliance.  Yet there is a considerable zone within which 
behavior is accepted as adequately conforming.  Most communities and law 
enforcement organizations with the United States, at least, seem to be perfectly 
comfortable with a situation in which the average speed on interstate highways is 
perhaps ten miles above the limit.  The problem for the system is not how to induce all 
drivers to obey the speed limit, but how to contain deviance within acceptable levels.  
And, so it is for international treaty obligations. 
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 17 (internal citations omitted). 
 12. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1935, 1962-63 (2002). 
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motivations is an exploration of the traditional international relations 
and legal theories. 
B. Traditional Theories and Adherence 
Over the years, scholars of both international relations and 
international law have developed a wide variety of theories that can 
offer insights about adherence.  Using the basic assumptions and 
arguments from several of the most prominent theories13 such as (1) 
structural realism, (2) modified structuralism, (3) neoliberal 
institutionalism, (4) hegemonic stability theory, and (5) 
constructivism, certain propositions about adherence can be 
developed.14 
1. Structural Realism.  One of the most persistent theories of 
international relations is structural realism.15  Structural realists begin 
with the assumption that states are the primary actors in the 
international system, and that this system is “anarchic.”  This does not 
mean that there is total chaos in the relations among states, but rather 
that there is “no common power,” no centralized governing system on 
the international plane to establish order.  This lack of a centralized 
enforcement system means that states cannot trust other states to 
behave in a way that will not threaten their security.16 
 
 13. At the outset, it should be noted that many international relations scholars do not 
explicitly explore the relationship between international legal rules and state behavior.  Instead, 
these scholars often refer to the role of norms and institutions.  Nonetheless, the basic contours 
of these theories can also be applied specifically to international legal regimes as well. 
 14. Mainstream international relations literature has typically fallen into these five 
theoretical camps.  Although more recent works have tended to focus around specific issues 
rather than theoretical schools, these theories are still considered the mainstream international 
relations theories and offer a useful point of departure for our analysis.  For more on the use of 
mainstream theories as a framework for analysis, see Ole R. Holsti, Models of International 
Relations and Foreign Policy, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORETICAL ESSAYS, (G. 
John Ikenberry ed., 2005). 
 15. While the theory of realism is often linked to Thucydides, in contemporary scholarship, 
mid-twentieth century writers such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
and E.H. Carr are generally regarded as the founders of “classical realism.”  See E.H. CARR, 
THE TWENTY-YEAR CRISIS, 1919-1939 passim (2d ed. 1946); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS 
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE passim (5th ed. 1978); GEORGE F. 
KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 (1951); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND 
IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1932).  Structural realism is most 
closely associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz.  KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Addison-Wesley 1979).  Structural realism is also referred to as 
“neo-realism.” 
 16. This is drawn from title of Professor Robert J. Lieber’s book.  ROBERT J. LIEBER, NO 
COMMON POWER: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (4th ed. 2001). 
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In game theory terms, structural realists see international 
relations as inherently conflicting as in a game of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.17  Because anarchy creates uncertainty about the other 
side’s motives, the precautionary move is to defect from the rules to 
preempt the other side from doing so first.  Accordingly, a structural 
realist would predict that international legal rules would not alter 
states’ behavior and independently induce cooperation.  In a system 
in which states struggle for power and security, states will be 
concerned not just with their absolute position in the system, but also 
with their position relative to other states.18  Gain is zero-sum and 
relative: advancement for one state means a relative loss for another, 
making prospects for cooperation—in which all states might actually 
gain—more difficult.  The fear of defection is always present, creating 
disincentives for states to modify their behavior to participate in 
international treaty regimes.  In the realist framework, institutions, 
and thus international legal rules, are epiphenomenal and do not 
independently “cause states to behave in ways they would otherwise 
would not behave—for example, foregoing short-term, self-interest in 
favor of long-term community goals.”19 
Not only do institutions “matter only on the margins” according 
to realists, but their development and composition are reflective of 
the international distribution of power.20  International agreements 
are struck by the most powerful states in the system and are favorable 
 
 17. William Aceves provides a succinct explanation of the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma provides an even more formal model of the international 
system and its effect on state behavior.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates how 
competing interests between two egoistic actors can lead to sub-optimal behavior.  The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is typically modeled as a 2 x 2 matrix.  Each player has two 
options: cooperate or defect.  The respective payoffs received by the players will 
depend upon the opposing player’s actions.  The highest payoff for each player is 
gained if she defects and the opposing player cooperates.  Similarly, the lowest payoff, 
referred to as the “sucker’s payoff,” is gained if she cooperates and the opposing 
player defects.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma contains four additional elements.  First, there 
is no mechanism for making enforceable threats or commitments.  Second, there is no 
way to ascertain what the other player will do.  Third, there is no way to avoid 
interaction with the other player.  Fourth, the payoff structure cannot be altered. 
William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L 
& POL’Y 227, 238-39 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 18. There is much in the international relations literature on the absolute gains versus 
relative gains debate.  See, e.g., Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International 
Relations Theory, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1303, 1303-20 (1991). 
 19. Randall Schweller & Daryl Preiss, A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions 
Debate, 41 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 1, 3 (1997). 
 20. John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5, 7 
(1995). 
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to that set of actors.21  Realists see institutions as only temporarily 
useful for achieving coordinated responses, such as NATO during the 
Cold War.  Once the raison d’etre behind the agreement disappears, 
adherence will dissipate commensurately.  Similarly, if state interests 
change and become opposed to a particular agreement, adherence 
will drop.  States are under no obligation to cooperate longer than 
their rational self-interest dictates.22 
In short, a structural realist would predict that states would be 
less inclined to adhere to international legal regimes,23 for fear that 
there is no common government to monitor and enforce rules.  In this 
Hobbesian24 world, states are particularly ill-advised to adhere to 
regimes that put a constraint on their ability to maximize security.  
Autonomy to pursue state security is paramount interest, and any 
agreement that infringes on their ability to do so is not advantageous 
and should not be approved.  In this sense, regimes that limit a state’s 
ability to defend itself, such as constraints on a state’s ability to test 
new weapons, or to use weapons that are considered by some parties 
in the international system to be inhumane, will elicit low levels of 
adherence.  While structural realists would recognize that states might 
sign and ratify an agreement for the sake of appearance, they would 
predict that states will not follow the provisions of the agreement 
when they perceive them to be inconvenient. 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, 15 
INT’L SEC. 5, 5, for a discussion of his realist views towards international institutions, in which he 
argues that the institutionalized alliances of the Cold War only stuck together because of 
rational self-interest. 
 23. One of the earliest definitions of regimes as the term has been used in the international 
relations theory community comes from John Gerard Ruggie.  Ruggie defined a regime as “a set 
of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial 
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”  John Gerard Ruggie, 
International Response to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 570 (1975).  
Perhaps the most common definition used in the literature today was developed by Stephen D. 
Krasner.  He defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.”  Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 186 (1982). 
 24. In his classic work, The Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes described the state of nature as one 
of war of all against all in which life was “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”  THOMAS 
HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 65 (Dent 1973) (1651). 
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2. Modified Structuralism.  Modified structural realists,25 unlike 
the structural realists, stake out a less extreme approach.  While they 
understand the problems inherent in anarchy, they believe that 
institutions offer a degree of order and predictability that is 
preferable to a completely unregulated international system.  As a 
consequence, states have incentives to bind themselves to 
international legal regimes.26  Some scholars have argued that a major 
factor affecting adherence is the nature of the issue area addressed by 
the regime.  Adherence to security regimes is less likely because the 
costs of defection are potentially immediate and grave.  In contrast, 
economic or environmental regimes offer opportunities for joint gains 
that would be difficult to achieve on a bilateral basis due to higher 
transaction costs.  Moreover, in the economic or environmental 
realm, the cost of defection may be financially or environmentally 
destructive, but not directly threatening to state survival.  This 
distinction between security regimes on the one hand, and economic 
and environmental regimes on the other, has been referred to as 
“high” and “low politics.”27  Modified structural realists would predict 
a higher likelihood of adherence in low politics than in high politics.28 
In addition to seeing a higher degree of institutionalized 
behavior than structural realists, modified structural realists make a 
distinction between the strongest states and either rising or weaker 
states.  Joseph Grieco has advanced a “voice opportunities” thesis in 
which weaker states might enter into institutionalized agreements in 
order to give them an opportunity to voice concerns, influence the 
agenda, and have some impact on stronger states.29  This thesis might 
 
 25. Stephen D. Krasner introduces the idea of “modified structural realism” to contrast 
with structural realism.  Krasner, supra note 23, at 185-86.  Randall Schweller and Daryl Preiss 
add to this debate, bringing to bear the characteristics of states as a determinant of whether 
global institutionalization can be attained.  Schweller & Preiss, supra note 19 passim. 
 26. Krasner notes that regimes are more likely to emerge and elicit adherence than 
structural realists would predict.  Krasner, supra note 23, at 191-93.  He notes, however, that 
such behavior is contingent on the issue area that has been institutionalized, with security issues 
acting more like the Prisoner’s Dilemma construct than economic issues.  Id. at 195-96. 
 27. Matters of “high politics” are those that touch at the core security concerns of a state—
thus, security regimes would fall squarely into the realm of high politics.  Matters of “low” 
politics are those that do not relate to the core security concerns of a state.  Typically, economic, 
trade, and environmental issues are considered to fall within the realm of low politics. 
 28. See generally Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding 
the Debate, 24 INT’L SEC. 42 (1999); Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and 
Security Affairs, 37 WORLD POL. 1 (1984). 
 29. Joseph M. Grieco, State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist 
Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union, 5 SEC. 
STUD., 261, 286-89. 
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explain why weaker members of a group of strong states would 
choose to bind themselves to international rules, while the strongest 
states would hold out given that their power speaks strongly enough. 
Accordingly, a modified structural realist might predict that 
States would be more inclined to adhere to international agreements 
in areas that fall more in the low politics range of the spectrum than 
those that fall in the high politics range.  They might also predict that 
less powerful states might be more inclined to adhere to international 
agreements if these agreements appear to grant “voice 
opportunities.” 
3. Hegemonic Stability Theory.  Hegemonic stability theory 
suggests that regime creation, maintenance, enforcement, and 
durability are directly linked to a dominant power.  Whether 
regarding security or trade regimes, hegemonic stability theorists 
argue that the concentration of power in one state means that the 
hegemonic state can use its power to create institutions, use a 
combination of carrots and sticks to gain cooperation from the 
periphery, and generate order, so long as its own hegemony endures.30  
As a consequence, if a state—or even non-state actor, such as the 
European Union—were behaving as a hegemon, this theory would 
predict that the hegemonic state would adhere to regimes to mold 
them into instruments through which to assert its power. 
The theory has had traction with both classical and structural 
realists.  E.H. Carr noted that great power concentrated in one state 
can create an international order, as the way the British Empire 
created a period of pax Britannica.31  Charles Kindleberger echoed a 
similar argument, but with respect to economic stability.  Noting that 
 
 30. Some observers have claimed that this take on hegemonic stability offers an insufficient 
explanation of hegemonic leadership, arguing that institutions endure longer than the 
perpetuation of the hegemony itself.  How else can the enduring institutional salience be 
explained other than that non-structural, non-materialist factors play an important role in 
facilitating cooperation?  A liberal, benign hegemony, some have argued, may reduce the 
competitive fears sparked by anarchy and promote adherence, credible verification and 
enforcement.  Randall L. Schweller & David Priess, supra note 19, at 16-18.  Several scholars 
have suggested that a “black box” approach to the state ignores important characteristics about 
the state’s character; these characteristics are important variables in explaining the nature of 
international order, adherence to this order, and durability of that order.  See, e.g., G. John 
Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, 23 
INT’L SEC. 43 passim (1999). 
 31. E.H. CARR, supra note 15, at 82-83.  The realist Robert Gilpin similarly maintains that 
the hegemony is responsible for creating the international order, including the system of trade, 
rights, and political relations.  See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR & CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 135 
(1981). 
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the Great Depression resulted in part because of a global power 
vacuum, he concluded that the maintenance of markets, stable 
exchange rates, and policy coordination created the need for one 
powerful country to assume responsibility.32 
In international legal literature, several scholars have written 
about the existence of hegemonic international law.33  This approach 
seems consistent with hegemonic stability theory, but is more willing 
to suggest that a hegemon may choose not to participate in certain 
treaty regimes.  In explaining this approach, Detlev Vagts has noted 
that hegemonic states 
[W]ould avoid agreements creating international regimes or 
organizations that might enable lesser powers to form coalitions 
that might frustrate the hegemon. . . . [but] a hegemon can use an 
international organization to magnify its authority by a judicious 
combination of voting power and leadership, as the United States 
has often done.34 
Vagts also suggests that a “dominant power can minimize the 
problem [of being held to troublesome treaties] by refusing to enter 
into treaties it finds inconvenient; one need not call the roll of these 
agreements, starting with the Law of the Sea Convention and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and running to the 
convention on land mines.”35 
In sum, hegemonic stability theory predicts that a hegemon 
would be likely to adhere to an international agreement if the 
agreement appears to magnify the power of the hegemon.  
Conversely, a hegemon would be less likely to adhere to an 
international agreement if the agreement seems to restrict the 
freedom of behavior of the hegemon. 
4. Neoliberal Institutionalism.  Neoliberal institutionalists36 also 
assume that the international system is anarchic but believe that there 
are significant reasons for participation in international legal regimes.  
Regimes, they argue, help create transparency in the motives and 
 
 32. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929-1939 passim (1973). 
 33. Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 843 (2001). 
 34. Id. at 846. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Some of the literature refers to these scholars as “rationalist institutionalists.”  See, e.g., 
Robert Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 381 (1988).  
The rationalist approach to cooperation suggests that states behave in a way that maximizes 
their utility functions.  It seeks to explain the conditions under which states will cooperate 
through institutionalized arrangements.  See id. at 381. 
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decision making of the other parties, alleviating the uncertainty 
inherent in anarchy.  They also reduce transaction costs associated 
with ad hoc exchanges in the international system, monitor and 
contribute to enforcement, and impose sanctions for violation, all of 
which modify the payoff structure in favor of cooperation.  Moreover, 
institutions lengthen the so-called “shadow of the future,” the 
likelihood and importance of future interaction.37  Expecting future 
iterations of the exchange may mean that one party is less likely to be 
“tempted by immediate gains brought by unilateral defection,” thus 
increasing the likelihood of cooperation.38 
Neoliberals would not suggest that actors enter into a regime that 
do not advance their interests.  But they recognize that states would 
benefit from such regimes.  Indeed, neoliberals would not expect 
regimes to arise unless those regimes allowed “states to do things they 
otherwise could not do, that is, achieve mutual gains from 
cooperation.”39  In this Lockean40 context, states are not motivated by 
altruism, but by gain.  Neoliberals, unlike realists, are not concerned 
with relative gain, however.  The prospect for absolute gain is a 
 
 37. Robert Axelrod discusses the emergence of cooperation as dependent on what he 
refers to as the “shadow of the future.”  See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 3-27 (1984).  The shadow of the future can also be conceived as follows: “If a 
state knows that it will interact with another state only once, the shadow of the future is 
nonexistent and the state can pursue its short-term goals without considering the need to 
interact with the other state on subsequent occasions. Institutional arrangements, however, 
facilitate repeated interactions among states and thus lengthen the shadow of the future. If a 
state knows that it will engage in many transactions over time through such an institutional 
arrangement, it will be concerned about its long-term relationships with other states and will 
thus have a motive to cooperate.”  Arend, supra note 4, at 121. 
 38. Kenneth Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 
WORLD POL. 1 (1985). 
 39. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin rebut Mearsheimer’s claim about the ineffectiveness 
of institutions, arguing that institutions may harness overlapping state interests and facilitate 
cooperation.  Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin, The Promise of International Institutions, 20 
INT’L SEC. 39, 39-41 (1995).  Specifically, Keohane and Martin take issue with Mearsheimer’s 
assertion, see supra note 20, at 7, that “institutions have minimal independent effect on state 
behavior.”  See id. 
 40. A Lockean international system would be one in which states—while still seeking to 
promote their own interests—would not exist in a constant state of fear.  Instead, they would be 
able to pursue their interests through cooperative means.  Alexander Wendt discusses the 
potential movement of the international system “into a Lockean world of (mostly) mutually 
recognized property rights and (mostly) egoistic rather than  competitive conceptions of 
security, reducing the fear that what states already have will be seized at any moment by 
potential collaborators, thereby enabling them to contemplate more direct forms of 
cooperation.”  Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 415-16 (1992). 
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sufficient motivation for a state to bind itself to international legal 
regimes. 
In defense of the assertion that states are more motivated by 
absolute gains conferred by institutions rather than relative gains 
pursued in the absence of institutions, some neoliberals cite states’ 
financial investment in particular regimes.41  Unless institutions 
impact state behavior, some scholars question why states would 
“invest resources in expanding international institutions.”42  
Investment is but one indicator of states’ commitment to the 
principles and benefits of institutionalized behavior.  As later sections 
will discuss, it is also one measure of state adherence. 
In sum, neoliberals would predict that states will be more likely 
to adhere to an international agreement if the agreement appears to 
grant long-term benefits to the states by reducing transaction costs, 
improving transparency, and allowing for the pooling of common 
resources.  It would also seem that states will be more willing to 
adhere to an international agreement if they perceive that there will 
be reciprocal benefits from membership in the regime. 
5. Constructivism.  Constructivism is one of the more recent 
additions to the mainstream of international relations theory.43  A 
self-styled sociological theory, constructivism44 makes two major 
assumptions about the nature of the international system. 
First, it asserts that the structure of the international system is a 
“social structure.”  As a social structure, the international system has 
both material and non-material elements (which the realists and 
neoliberals already claim).  Constructivists would argue that material 
conditions such as weapons, oceans, geography, and people are major 
elements of the international system.  What is different about the 
 
 41. Keohane & Martin, supra note 39, at 40. 
 42. Id. 
 43. There has been much recent scholarship on constructivism.  See, e.g., Martha 
Finnemore, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY passim (1996); Margaret Keck 
& Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS passim (1998); NICHOLAS G. ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING: 
RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS passim (1989); JOHN 
GERARD RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION passim (1998); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS passim (1999) 
 44. In some of the early literature, what has come to be called constructivism was referred 
to as “reflective approach.”  See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 36, at 379; Andrew Hurrell, 
International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 (V. Rittberger ed., 1993). 
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constructivist approach is that constructivists claim that these material 
elements have no inherent meaning apart from the interactions of 
international actors.  These elements are given meaning as states and 
other actors interact and establish relationships with each other.  
Alexander Wendt, for example, has explained that even the 
significance of state possession of nuclear weapons is not set.  In an 
often-cited example, Wendt contends that “500 British nuclear 
weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North 
Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the 
United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is 
a function of shared understandings.”45  In other words, even hard, 
material elements are meaningless in the absence of social 
relationships.  In addition to these material elements, constructivists 
would argue that there are also non-material elements in the 
international system.  States and other international actors create a 
variety of norms, including legal norms.  Like the material elements, 
these non-material elements also form a part of the structure of the 
international system. 
Second, constructivism claims that there is a “mutually-
constitutive” relationship between actor and structure.  On the one 
hand, the actors in the international system—states, 
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
corporations, and a variety of other non-state actors—create or 
constitute the structure of the international system.  The actors, 
through their interactions, create the non-material elements in the 
international system and give meaning to the material elements.  But 
on the other hand, the structure also constitutes the actors.  As the 
actors interact with each other in a given international system, the 
structural elements affect how the actors see themselves.46 
An example of this mutually constitutive relationship can be seen 
in the creation of the European Union.47  In the 1950s, a number of 
European states created the various institutions of European 
 
 45. Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT’L SEC. 71, 73 (1995). 
 46. How the structure creates the agent and how the agent acts as a force behind outcomes 
in the international system is at the heart of the agent-structure discussion in constructivism.  
Understanding the mutual constitution between agent and structure is integral to constructivism 
but often underdeveloped.  For more discussion on the agent-structure debate, see David 
Dessler, What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate, 43 INT’L ORG. 441, 443 (1989). 
 47. For a discussion of the European Union and state identity, see Thomas Banchoff, 
National Identity and EU Legitimacy in France and Germany, in LEGITIMACY AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: THE CONTESTED POLITY 180 (Thomas Banchoff & Michael P. Smith ed., 
1999). 
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integration—initially the European Coal and Steel Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community.  In doing this, they were 
creating a new structure for the European system.  But as time 
progressed, and the European states interacted with each other in the 
context of this structure, the structure has affected the nature of the 
actors and altered their identity.  What it means to be an individual 
state in Europe in 2005, for example, is very different than what it 
meant to be one in 1956.  The participation of those states over a 
period of years has thus affected the very identity of the individual 
states in Europe based on the evolution and interaction of ideas and 
states across time.48 
But while constructivism argues that the structure of the 
international system can alter the identity of actors, the structure does 
not inevitably have that effect.  In other words, it is entirely possible 
that states could create a particular structure—an international 
organization, or legal regime for that matter—that would have no real 
effect on the actors due to the nature of their interactions.  A treaty, 
for example, might be adopted by states but may not ultimately alter 
the identity of those states.  One of the problems with constructivism 
is that it has yet to develop a clear theory to determine the 
circumstances under which identity change will take place. 
What predictions would constructivism make about adherence to 
international regimes?  First, following the structural realists, 
constructivists would assert that it is possible that the states may sign, 
ratify, and even follow treaty provisions as a mere convenience.  
When confronted with a national goal that seems to contradict the 
treaty obligation, the state will feel no sense of obligation.  In short, 
the rule would be merely epiphenomenal—having no real effect on 
the behavior of states.  Second, just as the neoliberals claim, a 
constructivist would recognize that states might adhere to an 
international regime because of expectations and, in fact, the reality 
of reciprocal gain.  Third, and most important, constructivists would 
argue that it is possible that adherence may be connected to 
perceptions that the treaty regime defines the identity of the state.  
This can happen either from the outset or as the state participates in 
the treaty regime over time.  On the one hand, it is possible that when 
initially joining the treaty regime, the state will perceive the regime to 
 
 48. See Craig Parsons, Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union, 56 
INT’L ORG. 47 passim (2002), for a discussion on the role of ideas and identities in the European 
Union. 
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be in accordance with its identity and will comply.  Alternatively, it is 
also possible that the state will sign and ratify the agreement without 
any such perception, but will eventually come to see its identity 
defined by the treaty regime.  If this were to occur, the regime would 
have had a significant effect in altering the identity of the state.  
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, constructivists are not quite able to 
predict when this change in identity will take place, but they argue 
that this can happen and would point to historic examples where it 
has happened. 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
To explain state behavior relating to the participation of states in 
international legal regimes, this Article examines how states have 
acted with respect to several multilateral treaties.  While there is an 
extraordinarily wide range of both states and treaties to choose from, 
we selected states and treaties that would offer significant insight into 
state motivations. 
A. State Selection 
In choosing states, we selected states that would be generally 
considered great powers either at the global or regional level.  These 
states were selected for two primary reasons.  First, in order for treaty 
regimes to be effective instruments, it is often necessary to have the 
participation of the global and regional powers.  Because these states 
play major roles on the military, political, and/or economic planes, a 
treaty is less likely to achieve its goals if these states are outside the 
regime.  Second, the states selected are thought to cover the different 
positions identified in this study, offering a lens through which the 
motivations and adherence of different regional or global positions 
can be analyzed. 
These states can be classified as falling into one of four 
“positions” in the international system: hegemon, partner, 
competitor, and adversary.49  The hegemon is an actor that can 
exercise significant, if not dispositive, influence in either the global or 
regional system.  Robert Keohane defines a hegemon as a state that is 
“powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate 
 
 49. This framework has been developed based on Alex Wendt’s “three cultures of 
anarchy” construct that discusses Hobbes, Locke, and Kant (enemy, rival, and friend, 
respectively).  See ALEX WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 246-312 
(1999). 
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relations, and willing to do so.”50  In the treaty regimes explored in 
this Article, the United States clearly is the hegemon, but, as will be 
noted below, the European Union also seems to play that role in the 
WTO.  A partner is a state that generally has collaborative relations 
with other states in a particular system—whether global or regional.  
France and Germany, for example, are partners in the European 
system.  Their relationship is fundamentally collaborative, as they 
share common goals and visions for international politics.  Another 
way to conceptualize this relationship is to conceive a partner as 
existing in a Kantian51 relationship of amity with other states.  A 
competitor is a state that has rivalries with other states in particular 
systems but is able to work out certain levels of cooperation.  For 
example, Argentina and Brazil are competitors of Latin America 
because they compete for economic resources and in the area of 
international trade.  Despite the areas of disagreement, there is a 
Lockean52 relationship that permits collaboration through 
negotiations.  An adversary is a state that is generally in a non-
collaborative, enmity-like relationship with one or a number of other 
states.  Because of the Hobbesian53 nature of its relationships, 
cooperation with other states is extraordinarily difficult.  This was the 
classic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.  These positions can exist on either the global 
or regional level. 
Based on these classifications, the nineteen states under 
examination can be depicted on the following chart—with the caveats 
that states may fall into different positions in different contexts and 
some non-state actors, such as the European Union, may also fall into 
certain positions. 
 
 
 50. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 34-35 (1984). 
 51. IMMANUEL KANT, TO PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH, IN PERPETUAL 
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS (TED HUMPHREY trans., 1983).  International relations scholars 
have used Kant’s work as a basis for a particular understanding of international order.  See, e.g., 
BULL, supra note 25, at 23-25.  We use the concept of a Kantian system to indicate one in which 
the states share common goals and common norms.  In such a system, the basic mode of 
behavior is highly cooperative. 
 52. See Wendt, supra note 45. 
 53. See supra note 27. 
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Table 1. 
State Selection: Regional and International Power Comparison 
 
State Region Position Regional or Global Pairing 
Argentina Latin America Competitor Brazil 
Australia Pacific Partner 
United States, 
Commonwealth 
Countries 
Brazil Latin America Competitor Argentina 
Canada North 
America 
Partner Atlantic Region 
China East Asia Competitor Japan, Russia, 
United States 
Egypt Middle East Adversary Israel 
France Europe Partner Europe 
Germany Europe Partner Europe 
India South Asia Adversary Pakistan 
Iran Middle East Adversary Israel 
Israel Middle East Adversary Iran, Egypt 
Japan East Asia Partner United States 
Nigeria Africa Partner Africa 
Pakistan South Asia Adversary India 
Russia Eurasia Competitor United States, 
China 
South Africa Africa Partner Sub Saharan 
Africa 
Ukraine Europe Partner Europe, Russia 
United 
Kingdom 
Europe Partner Atlantic Region 
United States North 
America 
Hegemon China, Russia, 
Europe 
 
B. Treaty Regime Selection 
To examine state motivation for adherence to international 
agreements, we selected a range of treaty regimes that would allow us 
to test hypothesized reasons for participation.  As a way of clarifying 
any distinction between high and low politics international regimes, 
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we selected two treaty regimes that exemplified the consummate issue 
of high politics—security—and two that represent the realm of low 
politics—trade and the environment.  Looking at four regimes that 
span the high-low politics continuum allows for a better 
understanding of whether states are motivated differently by security 
and trade issues. That is, whether states view participation differently 
for different issue areas, and whether they are disproportionately 
concerned with relative gains in one set of issues compared to 
another. 
The treaty regimes also vary in other ways that we suspect might 
influence adherence behavior.  First, the regimes vary in the nature of 
their enforcement mechanisms.  If, as we expect, states’ concerns 
about violations by other states would be assuaged by a regime with 
an ability to verify adherence more credibly, we might see a higher 
propensity to participate in those regimes. 
Second, the treaty regimes vary in the degree to which they may 
be seen to infringe upon the sovereignty of state, or to put it another 
way, compromise the autonomy of states.54  On the low end, the 
treaties may modestly impose on autonomy, by affecting how a 
domestic audience regards legitimate policy.  A more intrusive regime 
may introduce inspectors into a country suspected of violation and 
may alter domestic institutional arrangements or policy.  We select 
treaties that vary in the degree to which they might interfere with 
domestic sovereignty.  Treaties with greater potential for 
intrusiveness might be associated with a state’s reluctance to ratify. 
Third, the treaty regimes also vary with respect to their degree of 
normativity.  While the term normativity has been variously used in 
international relations and international legal literature, we used the 
term to indicate the degree to which states and other actors in the 
international system perceive the obligations and institutions 
established by a particular legal regime to be efficacious.  Regime 
normativity can be thought of along a continuum running from “low” 
to “high.”  Low normativity would exist when there is little consensus 
among states and other relevant actors about the value of the regime.  
High normativity, on the other hand, exists when there is a very broad 
consensus in support of the value of the regime.  In such a 
 
 54. Stephen Krasner defines autonomy such that “no external actor enjoys authority within 
the borders of the state.”  Stephen Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20 INT’L SEC. 115, 116 
(1996).  If the treaty requires modification of state policies, this results in an infringement of 
state autonomy.  See id. 
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circumstance, there would be a general belief that the regime is 
efficacious. 
Various factors seem to contribute to the normativity of a legal 
regime.  Without providing an exhaustive list, some of these factors 
are as follows: moral efficacy, fairness, and authoritativeness.  Moral 
efficacy would mean that states—and perhaps other international 
actors—perceive the provisions and institutions embodied in the 
regime to have a large degree of ethical “goodness.”  The Slavery 
Convention,55 for example, would likely be seen as having moral 
efficacy because it embodies a prohibition against something that is 
nearly universally seen as morally repugnant.56  Fairness would 
embody two basic principles: procedural fairness and just 
distribution.57  If a treaty regime has both procedural fairness and is 
seen as providing a just distribution it would be seen as fair.  
Authoritativeness would refer to the degree to which the treaty 
regime is perceived to see to possess legal authority, the degree to 
which it is perceived to be the law.58  A treaty regime may have high 
authoritativeness if the regime were codifying a pre-existing rule of 
customary international law that had high authority.  For example, 
when the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations codified the 
concept of diplomatic immunity in 1961, the treaty had high authority 
because the pre-existing rule was well-established as highly 
authoritative.  A treaty regime could also enjoy high authority if it 
were produced at a conference that enjoyed a wide level of support.  
Certain provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
such as the 12-nautical mile territorial sea, received such a level of 
support that they would enjoy very high authority. 
With these hypothesized explanatory variables in mind, we 
selected the following four international regimes: The Comprehensive 
 
 55. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17, amended by Protocol Amending 
the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51. 
 56. For a discussion of the evolution of the norm against slavery, see Patricia M. 
Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as Defined 
by International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 883 passim (2004). 
 57. FRANCK, supra note 4, at 7.  Professor Franck explains that “procedural fairness” is the 
perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution 
has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right 
process.  Id.  When international actors perceive that the rule functions to produce a “just” 
allocation of resources, it possesses the second element of fairness.  Id. at 8. 
 58. A putative rule is perceived to be authoritative if the decision-making elites in states 
perceive the rule to be law.  In traditional legal parlance, a rule is authoritative if it has opinio 
juris.  This concept has been previously developed.  See AREND, supra note 4, at 87. 
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Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (1997 Land Mine Treaty); the World 
Trade Organization; and the Kyoto Protocol.  As the table below 
shows, the regimes were all developed around the same time period, 
but vary in where they fall on the high/low politics distinction, their 
potential to infringe on a state’s sovereignty, verification and 
enforcement, and normativity.59 
 
International 
Regime 
Year Open 
for 
Ratification 
High/ 
Low 
Politics 
Infringement 
on 
Sovereignty 
Enforce-
ment 
Norma-
tivity 
Compre-
hensive Test 
Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) 
1996 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Medium 
Land Mine 
Treaty 
1997 High Moderate Moderate High 
World Trade 
Organ-
ization 
(WTO) 
1995 Low Moderate High 
Uncer-
tain 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
1997 Low Moderate Low Mixed 
 
C. Evaluating Adherence 
While it is easy to determine if a state is a party to an 
international agreement, it is much more difficult to determine the 
precise level of state adherence to a treaty regime.  As a consequence, 
we will examine a variety of factors to evaluate the level of 
adherence.  First, and foremost, we will explore the degree to which 
the state in question carries out the legal obligations contained in the 
treaty—bearing in mind that a state may carry out the obligations of a 
treaty whether or not it is a formal party.60  In addition to looking at 
 
 59. See infra Part III for a discussion of these factors and the specific treaty regimes. 
 60. The most obvious and often-cited indication of adherence is whether a state is fulfilling 
the provisions included in the treaty.  For example, in the case of the Land Mine Treaty, has a 
state party destroyed all stockpiles and all landmines under their jurisdiction, while also 
terminating the production and exportation of landmines?  Given that each treaty has a number 
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the degree to which a state follows the explicit obligations of a treaty, 
we will also examine a variety of other factors that indicate 
adherence.  One of these factors is institutional investment, or the 
willingness of the state to expend funds or establish domestic 
institutions for purposes of supporting the treaty regime.  Another 
factor is domestic embedding, which refers to the degree to which a 
state has adopted legislation to implement provisions of the treaty 
within that state’s domestic legal system.  In the United States, for 
example, congressionally enacted legislation that executes provisions 
of a treaty that is not self-executing is the most obvious example.61  
Yet another factor is the willingness of the state to accept any dispute 
settlement mechanisms established by the treaty regime.  This would 
mean both the state’s willingness to participate in the proceedings of 
any such mechanisms and its willingness to accept and abide by 
decisions of such proceedings.  Finally, we will also explore the 
willingness of states to participate in conferences or other 
negotiations connected to the treaty regime.  In short, while there is 
no scientific method for determining adherence with precision, 
examining factors such as these and others that may be specific to a 
particular treaty regime should provide substantial information on 
which to make judgments about levels of adherence. 
D. Determining State Motivations 
Just as there is no precise method for determining adherence, so 
too is there no perfect method for determining why a state adheres to 
a particular international legal regime.62  Short of entering the minds 
of the decision-making elites that act for the state, any method will 
provide only a limited vision of state motives.  Nonetheless, one of 
the tasks of contemporary political science is to offer a window into 
the motives of decision makers.  One way to do this is to examine 
 
of provisions, it is conceivable that states may adhere to several provisions, one provision, or 
even part of one provision, but not the treaty in its entirety. 
 61. For example, it is common practice in the United States to enact legislation for treaties 
that are not self-executing.  The United States passed the Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (2000), and the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340B (2000), both of which were congressionally-enacted for the purpose of executing those 
two particular non-self-executing treaties. 
 62. As noted at the outset of this article, Professor Michael Glennon has eloquently 
commented on the problem of assessing causation in international relations and has expressed 
profound skepticism about efforts to determine the motivations of policymakers.  Glennon, 
supra note 3, at 987-89 (arguing that it is impossible to know the motives of decision makers). 
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what these decision makers say about their motivation for adhering to 
international agreements.  By looking at official documents, speeches, 
and statements, an investigator can glean a basic understanding about 
the justifications states give for their adherence behavior.63  While 
undoubtedly these official statements are imperfect,64 they still 
provide an important indicator of motivation.65  Accordingly, this 
Article will explore a variety of statements made by decision making 
elites in the public fora.  We believe that these public proclamations 
will provide significant insight into motives for adherence. 
III.  APPLICATION 
A. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
1. Background of the Treaty Regime. 
a. Background.  Supported strongly by the U.N. General 
Assembly, negotiations to proscribe nuclear testing in all 
environments began in 1993.  Between 1993 and 1996, the treaty was 
drafted and ultimately opened for signature on September 10, 1996.  
At that time, 71 states, including the 5 nuclear weapon states, signed 
the treaty in New York.  At present, 176 have signed the treaty, 131 
 
 63. Professor Jeffry Frieden in his discussion of state preferences calls this method 
“observation.” Jeffry A. Frieden, Actors and Preferences in International Relations, in 
STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39, 40 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell 
eds., 1999). 
 64. Frieden points out the difficulty of this observational method for determining state 
motivations: 
All these ways to pin down the preferences imputed to nation-states for use in further 
analysis share a major problem, common to the investigation of anything that cannot 
be directly observed.  The attempt to “induce” preferences by observation risks 
confounding preferences with their effects.  The behavior observed—policies, 
statements, responses to surveys—is used “inductively” as indicative of preferences.  
Yet, in all these instances it may well be that this behavior results only partially, 
perhaps misleadingly, from underlying preferences.  Perhaps the environment within 
which the behavior takes place is responsible for it in important ways that make it 
impossible to “read back” from behavior to preferences.  The problem is well 
understood by survey researchers, who spend a great deal of time trying to make sure 
that the observation (the answer) is as true a reflection as possible of the individual’s 
beliefs (the opinion). 
Id. at 59. 
 65. Even though Frieden points out the pitfalls of this approach, he acknowledges that 
“[i]n many instances, [the observational approach] may be the best research strategy available.”  
Id. at 60. 
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of whom have ratified.66  Because the CTBT addresses nuclear 
weapons and their effects on war and peace, it and other treaties 
designed to control proliferation fall under the category of high 
politics.67 
b. Legal Obligations.  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty68 
requires that each state party not “carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and . . . prohibit[s] and 
prevent[s] any such nuclear explosion at any place under its 
jurisdiction or control.”69  The Treaty’s provisions prevent testing 
nuclear weapons in all environments.  Although all nuclear states 
have signed the CTBT, it has not yet entered into force because not 
all of the forty-four states known to possess nuclear weapons or 
reactors have ratified the treaty.  To date, only thirty-three have done 
so, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and France.  Other key 
nuclear states, including the United States, India, Pakistan, Israel, and 
China have not ratified. 70  Nonetheless, several of the nuclear states—
the United States and China—have signed a moratorium on nuclear 
tests, indicating their intent not to test nuclear weapons.71 
 
 66. For ratification data on the CTBT, see CTBTO Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, http://www.ctbto.org (last visited Mar. 
8, 2006). 
 67. There is a rich literature on arms control.  See MICHAEL A. LEVI & MICHAEL E. 
O’HANLON, THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL (2005); CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR DEBATES: 
MISSILE DEFENSE, ARMS CONTROL, AND ARMS RACES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(Alexander T.J. Lennon, ed. 2002); Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of 
Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 
Berkeley J. Int’l L. 405 (2003). 
 68. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027/Annex, 35 I.L.M. 1439 
(1996) [hereinafter CTBT].  For further background on the CTBT, see ROBERT KIRK, A 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: A NEW VERIFICATION ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY passim (1995). 
 69. CTBT, supra note 68, art. 1. 
 70. Id. art. XIV.  Of these forty-four states, the following have signed and ratified: Algeria, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. 
The following have signed, but not ratified: China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, 
United States of America, Vietnam. The following have neither signed nor ratified: Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, India, and Pakistan.  See Status of Signature and Ratification, 
http://www.ctbto.org (select “Signature and Ratification” hyperlink; then select “Status” 
hyperlink; then select “Go” button) (last visited Feb. 2, 2006). 
 71. Reference to China’s moratorium is included in the Chinese official statement at the 
2003 Entry into Force Conference in Vienna.  See H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan, Head of the 
Chinese Delegation, Statement at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the 
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c. Enforcement Mechanisms.  The CTBT includes a verification 
regime intended to monitor and detect any nuclear test around the 
globe.  The International Monitoring System (IMS) includes 321 
monitoring stations and sixteen laboratories intended to collect 
evidence of nuclear tests.72  The system monitors global activity, which 
is then processed and recorded by CTBT Organization (CTBTO) 
analysts.  IMS data is sent to state signatories, who can respond by 
requesting clarification of possible non-adherence.  State parties that 
receive requests must provide clarification within forty-eight hours.  If 
information provided for clarification is not satisfactory to the state 
that requested information, an on-site inspection (OSI) may be 
requested.  The intent of the inspection would be to ascertain any 
violation of the Treaty, “gather any facts which might assist in 
identifying any possible violator,”73 and to provide a final verification 
measure.  Only after the Treaty enters into force, however, would 
OSIs be conducted.  Thus, no inspections have occurred to date.  In 
sum, the verification/enforcement arrangements of the CTBT would 
seem to be “low.” 
d. Effect on Sovereignty.  By itself, the International 
Monitoring System (IMS) is not intrusive.  Its monitoring of global 
events is more surveillance of all global activity rather than of 
specifically targeted states.  What may be perceived by some states to 
be intrusive are the next verification and enforcement steps.  
Although the CTBTO asserts that the inspection “would be 
conducted in the least intrusive manner to protect the national 
security interests of the Inspected State Party” and that “the 
disclosure of confidential information unrelated to the purpose of the 
inspection would be prevented,” the net effect is that the suspected 
state must admit inspectors into its country.74  Accordingly, the CTBT 
 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Apr. 9, 2003), http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/ 
hy2003/t85267.htm [hereinafter Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan].  See THE NAT’L 
ACADEMIES (July 31, 2002), Academy Addresses Technical Issues in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: 
Verification Capabilities Are Good, Cheating Possibilities Are Limited, and Safety and Reliability 
of U.S. Weapons Can Be Maintained Without Nuclear Tests, http://www4.nationalacademies.org/ 
news.nsf/isbn/0309085063?OpenDocument for historical reference to the American 
moratorium. 
 72. The verification regime is established by art. IV of the CTBT and elaborated upon in 
the Protocol to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  CTBT, supra note 68, art. IV; see also id., 
Protocol. 
 73. Id. art. IV, sec. D, para. 35. 
 74. CTBTO, OVERVIEW OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME, http://www.ctbto.org/ 
verification/onsiteinspection.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
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regime infringement on sovereignty would be rated at the “high” 
level. 
e. Normativity.  In light of what some commentators have 
called the “nuclear taboo,” 75 it might seem at the outset that the 
normativity of the CTBT would be very high.  But there is still a 
strong sense by states such as the United States and China that 
certain testing of weapons is necessary to maintain the reliability of 
the nuclear stockpiles.76  Moreover, states like India and Pakistan 
seem to believe that a regime that prohibits testing for all states 
operates in an unfair manner for those states that do not have a well-
developed nuclear stockpile.77  Because of these varying beliefs about 
the regime, it will be rated at a “moderate” level. 
2. Adherence Behavior.  Given this analysis, states seem to fall 
into three categories: high, medium, and low adherence.  Eight states 
fall into the high range: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.  Four states fall 
into the medium category: Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa.  And 
seven states fall into the low area: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, 
Pakistan, and the United States. 
Of the states that have technically fulfilled the provisions of the 
treaty—all states except Pakistan and India—adherence behavior has 
been variable.  What may explain the variance are states’ historical 
ambitions regarding nuclear weapons.  Some states, such as Canada, 
have never seriously considered a nuclear program and required little 
deliberation before ratifying and fulfilling the provisions of the treaty 
regime.  These states tend to adhere more closely to the regime in part 
because doing so requires no deviation of their current policy. 
Other CTBT states such as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, 
had at one time considered nuclear programs but had already agreed 
to restrict their nuclear development with the ratification of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Since testing a nuclear device is a 
key component of nuclear development, fulfillment of the CTBT 
provisions is almost a de facto prerequisite for NPT ratification by 
non-nuclear states.  Nonetheless, these states not only have fulfilled 
the provisions but have been consistent participants in the regime and 
 
 75. See, e.g., NINA TANNENWALD ET AL., THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1945 passim (2005). 
 76. See infra notes 80-82, 91-93 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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advocates of the universalization of the treaty.  South Africa has gone 
even further and hosted workshop and training programs on the 
CTBT for African states, acting almost as a CTBT ambassador to its 
region.78 
Since the NPT allows nuclear states to retain their inventories, 
the nuclear states represent more difficult cases when looking at the 
effect of the treaty on state behavior.  Of the internationally 
recognized nuclear states, three have ratified the treaty, but none of 
the states, even those that have not ratified (China and the United 
States), have confirmed tests.  France, which was actively testing 
during the CTBT negotiations of 1995, advocated the zero option 
prohibiting any level or circumstance of testing.  After completing 
final testing in January 1996, France dismantled its Pacific test site 
and was one of the first states—along with the U.K., another nuclear 
state—to ratify the CTBT in April 1998. 
China, Russia, and the United States each present different 
permutations on the ratification and adherence combination.  China 
was one of the first states to sign the treaty in September 1996 but has 
not yet ratified; nonetheless, it issued a moratorium on testing in July 
1996 and reasserted its commitment to that moratorium in 1999.  It 
also has plans to establish twelve International Monitoring Stations 
(IMS) on its territory, has been an active participant in the 
Conferences, and has established a National Preparatory Authority 
for Implementation of CTBT that is in charge of Treaty 
implementation in China.  China has urged other nuclear states to 
continue observing their moratoria on testing and a timely 
universalization of the treaty, particularly by those countries whose 
erroneous position on the treaty have prevented ratification.79 
China, however, continues to have unresolved reservations about 
the Treaty.  First, China retains its early concern about the zero yield 
circumstance, which would prohibit “peaceful nuclear explosions” 
 
 78. “South Africa concluded ‘facility agreements’ with the CBTO permitting it to establish, 
in terms of the Treaty, International Monitoring System (IMS) stations within South Africa at 
Boshof, Marion Island, Sutherland and at the SANAE base in Antarctica.”  Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, available 
at http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/ctbt.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
 79. See H.E. Ambassador Shen Guofang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Statement at 
the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (Nov. 12, 2001), http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/chinaE.htm [hereinafter 
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Shen Guofang]. 
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(PNEs).80  While China has dropped its earlier insistence, it has 
asserted the need to address PNEs ten years after entry into force; 
China appears to believe that PNEs may be necessary for the 
maintenance and modernization of its inventory, which suggests that 
even if China were to ratify, its future adherence is uncertain.  
Second, China objects to using National Technical Means (NTM)—
overhead reconnaissance satellites—for verification of adherence 
behavior.  They argue that using NTM gives a monitoring advantage 
to Russia and the United States, who have a comparative advantage 
in reconnaissance technology.  Moreover, they have continued to 
oppose allowing NTM as part of the verification regime, specifically 
with the triggering of on-site inspections (OSI), which are considered 
intrusive and an infringement on sovereignty.81  In spite of these 
reservations, China publicly endorses the treaty and indicates that it 
“attaches importance to the treaty and has been working unswervingly for its 
early entry into force.”82 
Russia was an early signatory of the CTBT and ratified the 
treaty, but its adherence has been more circumspect.  The Russian 
nuclear test site, Novaya Zemlya, has sparked suspicion for several 
reasons.  First, the Russian government has asserted the importance 
of maintaining the test site as a matter of national security and pride 
as a nuclear state.  Second, the northern facility lacks transparency, 
and open source details of nuclear testing are controvertible, making 
CTBT violations difficult to discern.  The Russian government has 
acknowledged that they maintain and even upgrade the site, that they 
have conducted subcritical tests—allowed under the Treaty—and that 
they may need to resume testing in the future depending on political 
 
 80. In earlier negotiations, China argued that PNEs were necessary for the development of 
peaceful nuclear energy.  China used its status as a “developing country” to argue that it would 
suffer a disadvantage were it not allowed to explore advanced nuclear technology.  The CTBT, 
China argued, would limit scientific and technological development.  See The Chinese 
Delegation, Statement on the “Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion” Before the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Working Group II, (Mar. 9, 1995), available at 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ctbt0395.htm. 
 81. One of China’s consistent reservations regarding the CTBT has been the use of NTM 
for inspections.  See NTI AND CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, COMPREHENSIVE 
TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), http://www.nti.org/db/china/ctbtorg.htm; see also NTI AND 
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, CHINA’S ATTITUDE TOWARD NATIONAL 
TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) OF VERIFICATION,  http://www.nti.org/db/china/ntmpos.htm (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2006).  See also Sha Zukang, Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on 
Disarmament (Aug. 1, 1996), http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/sha0896.htm. 
 82. See Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan, supra note 71. 
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developments.83  The rhetoric, subcritical tests, and active 
maintenance of the facility call into question Russia’s commitment to 
the moratorium.  If Russia determined the need to resume nuclear 
tests, it would be required to test subcritically, test clandestinely, or 
withdraw from the treaty.  For now, however, Russia maintains that it 
is committed to the treaty and its moratorium and that the U.S. media 
and government has charged Russia with violations of the CTBT only 
to distract international attention away from its own failure to ratify 
the treaty.84 
Although the United States contributes financially to the 
CTBTO, its overall adherence appears to be waning.85  President 
Clinton signed the treaty in 1996 and submitted it for advice and 
consent by the Senate in 1997.86  On October 13, 1999, the Senate 
failed to approve the treaty by a vote of 51-48.87  President Bush, 
though he has applauded states such as Libya for committing to the 
CTBT, has been loath to bind the United States to the treaty, arguing 
instead the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is necessary for 
dealing with new threats and requires testing as part of the 
development.88  Thus far, the United States has gone about 
 
 83. See NTI AND CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, RUSSIA: ARCHIVED CTBT 
RATIFICATION AND NUCLEAR TESTING DEVELOPMENTS; NOVAYA ZEMLYA TEST SITE TO BE 
MAINTAINED; RUSSIA COMPLETES PLANNED SERIES OF SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR TESTS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH CTBT STANDARDS; http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/treaties/ 
ctbt2.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 84. Comparisons of the Russian and American nuclear programs have been documented 
by numerous analysts, including those at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, which has compiled evidence and analysis from 
open-source materials regarding the Russian and U.S. nuclear development programs.  See, e.g., 
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, RENEWED U.S.- RUSSIAN CONTROVERSY OVER 
NUCLEAR TESTING (May 27, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020527.htm. 
 85. The United States has typically been a substantial contributor to the treaty regime but 
in recent years has decreased its contribution.  It continues to support monitoring activities 
through the International Monitoring System but has limited its financial support to the regime, 
earmarking funding only for the monitoring system.  See, e.g., Daryl Kimball, Arms Control 
Association, Maintaining U.S. Support for the CTBT Verification System, (2002), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/ctbtver.asp. 
 86. Marion Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law 92, AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 59 (1998). 
 87. See http://foreign.senate.gov/treaties.pdf, for the legislative history of the CTBT in the 
U.S. Senate. 
 88. See, e.g., George Perkovich, Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in 
Nonproliferation, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2003), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301 
facomment10334/george-perkovich/bush-s-nuclear-revolution-a-regime-change-in-
nonproliferation.html.  The Bush administration has asserted the goal of maintaining primacy, 
which it argues may require modernization of its existing capabilities.  See id. 
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maintaining and modernizing its nuclear inventory by conducting sub-
critical tests, which are periodically conducted by the National 
Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA).89 
United States government policy statements, however, have 
hinted at the need for more robust testing in the future.  The 2002 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states the need for a responsive 
infrastructure, one that is capable of maintaining confidence in the 
existing inventory and developing new capabilities for the purpose of 
addressing future security threats.90  The briefing associated with the 
NPR indicated that significant investment and modification to the 
existing force would be required to meet the requirements for a 
responsive infrastructure.91  Also associated with the NPR has been 
an increase in funds to study the modernization of the nuclear force 
and specific warheads; while the study is within the provisions of the 
CTBT, any development of new weapons would violate the 
provisions.92  Although the United States has maintained a 
moratorium on testing, it holds open the possibility that new weapons 
may be required and tested.93 
Ratification and adherence for the unofficial nuclear states have 
been decidedly low.  In addition to India and Pakistan, which did not 
ratify but did conduct tests,94 several Middle Eastern states appear to 
 
 89. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service report, Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Testing 
and Comprehensive Test Ban: Chronology Starting September 1992, Order Code 97-1007 F (June 
9, 2005). 
 90. See Perkovich, supra note 88. 
 91. Leaks from Nuclear Posture Review indicates that “new capabilities must be developed 
to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets to find and attack mobile and 
relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit 
collateral damage.”  For reports on the leaked report, see David Ruppe, U.S. Seeks Range of 
New Nuclear Capabilities, Leaked Document Indicates, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Mar. 
14, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020314-nuke01.htm.  For the official 
briefing on the report, see, e.g., Defense Department News Transcript, Special Briefing on the 
Nuclear Posture Review, (Jan. 9, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_ 
t0109npr.html; Congressional Research Service, Amy F. Woolf, The Nuclear Posture Review: 
Overview and Emerging Issues, Order Code RS21133 (Jan. 31, 2002). 
 92. Though Congressional support has been limited, the Congress did fund Department of 
Energy and Defense research for “bunker buster” weapons.  For a thorough discussion of the 
NPR and follow-on policies, see PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, TRACKING NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/proliferation/countries/us.html. 
 93. The Pentagon, in its press release for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicated its 
continuing opposition to the CTBT but also its continuing support for the moratorium on 
testing.  Transcript of Press Release available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Pentagon Press Release]. 
 94. The Acronym Institute, which monitors nonproliferation, cites that three states—India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea—have not signed the CTBT.  See The Acronym Institute, Pakistan 
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be concerned not just with their own ability to develop nuclear 
weapons but with the inability to verify effectively whether regional 
competitors are testing weapons that could be used offensively.  
Adherence is low for the Middle East countries under consideration, 
as the Egyptian representative to the Conference on Facilitating the 
Entry in to Force of the CTBT noted that the “question of the 
ratification of the CTBT cannot neglect regional considerations 
associated with the Middle East[,] [e]specially, Israel’s position vis-à-
vis the ratification of the treaty, and her stances on nuclear non-
proliferation in general.”95  Israel signed the treaty in 1996, but claims 
not to have ratified because of concerns with verification.96  To this 
end, it has offered to participate in the development of the 
verification regime, as well as commit resources to the monitoring 
technology for the region.97  While agreeing to build monitoring 
stations in Israel is more likely an indicator of Israel’s interest in 
promoting its own security rather than a sign of commitment to the 
treaty regime itself, Israel has vigorously asserted its general support 
for credible verification as a sine qua non for its entry into the 
regime.98 
In reading statements from states as to what concerns cause them 
not to ratify or adhere to the CTBT, a clear pattern emerges.  When it 
comes to nuclear weapons, many states recognize that their own 
security is directly a function of the activities of other states.  In this 
regard, security gains for one side are considered to be a loss for the 
other side, creating a security dilemma between or among the 
competitor states.  Fear that an adversary would not adhere to the 
treaty results in non-adherence in other competitor states.  The ways 
 
Responds to India’s Nuclear Doctrine, 41 DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (Nov. 1999), 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/41pakis.htm. 
 95. H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, Statement at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force Of 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Nov. 11-13, 2001), http://www.un.org/webcast/ 
ctbt/statements/egyptE.htm [hereinafter Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak].  
Egypt’s statement at the Entry into Force Conference reflects that of other Middle East 
countries, including Iran, which are concerned with Israel’s nuclear development and its 
potential to target other countries in the region.  See id. 
 96. Pentagon Press Release, supra note 93. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Israel’s position on the CTBT is captured in the national statement by Gideon Frank.  
See Gideon Frank, Director General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, Statement at the 
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(Nov. 11, 2001), http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/israelE.htm [hereinafter Statement 
by Gideon Frank]. 
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in which those fears animate states are manifested as different 
patterns of behavior. 
While China, for example, appears to be concerned about its 
position of disadvantage if it ratifies, the United States has not.  In 
spite of the oblique language, China is clearly concerned with the 
United States’ decision not to ratify: “It is notable that regrettable 
voices have been uttered in the process of endeavoring for an early 
entry into force of the CTBT.  The 1st Conference on Facilitating the 
Entry into Force of the CTBT had barely concluded, a country 
explicitly refused to ratify the treaty. More recently, it even asserted 
that it would participate in the work of the PrepCom for CTBTO 
selectively.”99  China, as previously noted, is also concerned with the 
United States’ and Russia’s relative advantage in monitoring and 
verifying nuclear activity.  Not only has the United States not ratified 
the treaty, it (as well as Russia) also has superior technology for doing 
reconnaissance on test activities.100  China is, therefore, not only 
concerned with the constraints that CTBT ratification would place on 
it primarily vis-à-vis the United States, but also concerned with its 
relative deficiency in the ability to monitor test activity.  Its position 
as a rising power and a potential challenger to the United States in 
the capacity of global hegemon means that it monitors the U.S. 
behavior and adheres on a level of rough parity with the hegemon. 
Concerns with relative security influence, not just the behavior of 
challenging powers, but also the behavior of regional powers.  A close 
look at the empirical record on ratifications suggests that regional 
powers ratify, or fail to ratify, in blocs.  The three European regional 
partners—Germany, France, and the U.K.—signed and ratified in the 
same period.101  Specifically, the two nuclear powers coordinated on 
submitting their instruments of ratification on the same day, among 
the first thirteen states to ratify the treaty.102 
Brazil and Argentina offer another example in which regional 
powers—this time regional competitors—have worked in tandem to 
commit themselves to non-proliferation.  Both states engaged in 
nuclear research in the 1970s, but began negotiating joint non-
proliferation agreements that culminated with a bilateral agreement 
signed in 1991, the signing of the regional non-proliferation 
 
 99. Statement by H. E. Ambassador Shen Guofang, supra note 79. 
 100. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, supra note 95. 
 101. See supra note 70, at the CTBTO hyperlink for the status of signature and ratification. 
 102. Statement by Gideon Frank, supra note 98. 
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agreement in 1993-94, and the ratification of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty several years later.103  Although Argentina has 
been the first to ratify each of these previous agreements, Brazil took 
the lead in signing the CTBT, with Argentina ratifying within months 
thereafter.  For the CTBT and the previous non-proliferation 
agreements, the regional cooperation must be understood in terms of 
rapprochement between the two powers.  Each country had gradually 
dismissed long-held nuclear development policies through the process 
of bilateral negotiations involving transparency and confidence-
building measures.104  The result has been a de-escalation of previous 
competitive tensions and a joint willingness to conclude their nuclear 
ambitions. 
The Brazil-Argentina example reflects a neoliberal institutional 
motivation.  Although the history between the two states has been 
tense at times, given their previous nuclear ambitions, both states 
have concluded that maximizing their own security and economic 
position depends on strong bilateral relations, which are made more 
efficient with the transparency afforded by the non-proliferation 
institutions.  The gradual commitment to these institutions has been a 
process of reciprocity, in which both sides have acknowledged the 
opportunity for mutual gain, sat down at the negotiating table, and 
offered their cooperation.  In the initial phases, Argentina made the 
overtures by ratifying first, but specifically with the CTBT, Brazil 
ratified before Argentina, cementing the tit-for-tat process of 
reciprocity between the two states, consistent with neoliberal 
institutionalist expectations of cooperation. 
Conversely, the motivations by the non-ratifying states in the 
Middle East—regional adversaries—are consistent with realist 
concerns with anarchy and relative gains.  States appear to react to 
the perceived threat of Israel, which is thought to have a well-
developed nuclear program but has not ratified either the NPT or the 
 
 103. John R. Redick, et. al., Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the 
Nonproliferation Regime, 18 WASH. Q. 107, 110-12 (1995).  The agreement of the early 1990s 
was a pact between Argentina and Brazil and signed by the IAEA and Agência Brasileiro-
Argentina de Contabilidade e Contrôle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC), an agency designed 
to account for and control nuclear development in South America.  This bilateral agreement 
allowed for full-scale IAEA safeguards of the nuclear installations in each country.  After being 
signed in 1991, it was finally ratified by Brazil in 1994.  Brazil and Argentina both signed the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994, creating a regional nuclear free zone of Latin America.  See 
BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR 
MATERIALS (ABACC), http://www.abacc.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
 104. Redick et al., supra note 103, at 110-12. 
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CTBT.105  The Middle East regional powers that have not ratified the 
CTBT consistently cite Israel as their main reason for not ratifying.  
Iran, echoing the concerns of Egypt, asserted that the “the Middle 
East is threatened by the Israeli nuclear program . . . .  This policy of 
terror has . . . created a situation where many disarmament and arms 
control instruments have failed to receive the full support of regional 
countries.”106  These states are unwilling to constrain their own 
development as long as the regional nuclear threat is unconstrained.  
Any tests that Israel conducts are thought to compromise the security 
of the surrounding states; such rationale is clearly a zero sum, realist 
calculation. 
Israel operates out of a similar set of concerns, but their specific 
concern appears to be with credible verification of other state parties 
to the treaty.  The Israeli government asserts its long-standing 
support for non-proliferation, but claims that it is not confident in the 
ability of the verification regime to detect violators.107  Rather, it 
questions the regime’s “immunity to abuse” and argues that verifiable 
adherence by other states in the Middle East is required for Israel to 
participate more fully in the regime.108  In short, all states in the 
Middle East perceive their security to be at particular risk when a 
rival state chooses not to adhere to the security regime and when 
compliance cannot be adequately verified.  Given these calculations, 
the Middle Eastern states under consideration have chosen not to 
ratify. 
Concerns with infringement on sovereignty have motivated 
several states, including China.  One of China’s concerns in 
negotiations has been the use of on-site negotiations as a vehicle for 
treaty verification. 109  The government was concerned that using 
human intelligence as a warrant for inspections would legitimize 
espionage, and that requests for inspections might be vulnerable to 
 
 105. See id. 
 106. H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Statement at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York (Nov. 11-13, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/ 
webcast/ctbt/statements/iranE.htm; see also Nuclear-Weapon Use by Terrorists, ‘Chain Of 
Setbacks’ in Disarmament Among Issues Highlighted in Test-Ban-Treaty Conference, text from 
the Second Meeting of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, 
available at http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2001/un_pressrelease_111101_pm.pdf 
[hereinafter Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif] (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
 107. See Statement by Gideon Frank, supra note 98. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, supra note 106. 
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abuses by other state parties.110  In signing the treaty, China asserted 
the importance of its sovereignty: 
[The Chinese Government] firmly opposes the abuse of verification 
rights by any country, including the use of espionage or human 
intelligence, to infringe upon the sovereignty of China and impair 
its legitimate security interests in violation of universally recognized 
principles of international law.111 
In part as a result of China’s concerns regarding inspections as well as 
the sovereignty concerns of the United States, the treaty requires that 
thirty of the Executive Council’s fifty-one members approve any 
inspection.112  Maintaining sovereignty and eschewing the 
transparency generally associated with institutions is a consistent 
interest of China with regard to this treaty. 
Although the United States was the first to sign the CTBT 
(China was second), the early signature was not an early indicator of 
its commitment to the treaty.  The United States has applauded states 
that ratified the treaty, as it did with Libya when it ratified in January 
2004,113 but has, nevertheless, slipped away from ratifying the treaty.  
International reaction to the Senate’s vote against the treaty in 1999 
does not appear to have changed the American position towards 
ratification,114 and in fact, the United States has become even less 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Statement by the Chinese Government upon Signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) (Sept. 24, 1996), http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ctbtdec.htm. 
 112. The so-called “green light” procedure authorizes inspections after thirty of the fifty-one 
Council members approve a state party’s request for inspection.  The Executive Council consists 
of Annex I countries with representation from Africa (ten), Eastern Europe (seven), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (nine), Middle East and South Asia (seven), North America and 
Western Europe (ten), and the Pacific (eight).  See art. II, the Organization, sec. C of the CTBT.  
Discussion of the green light procedure may be found at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/ctbtorg.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 113. In a joint declaration with the European Union, the United States cited the Libyan 
accession to the CTBT, its cooperation with the IAEA, and its accession to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention as examples of successful efforts to control proliferation.  See Press 
Release, the White House, Text Of U.S.-EU Declaration On The Non-Proliferation Of 
Weapons Of Mass Destruction (June 26, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2004/06/20040626-6.html. 
 114. Several countries asserted their disappointment with the U.S. vote, including Japan, 
China, Canada, Australia, and Ukraine.  See, e.g., Country Statements at the Conference on 
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and various Embassy 
statements, including Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Remarks By Secretary Of State, 
Madeleine K. Albright and Ichita Yamamoto, Japanese State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
(Oct. 18, 1999), http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/WF991018/epf103.htm .  Though U.S. 
diplomats, particularly under the Clinton administration, continued to express their support for 
expeditious ratification, the United States has not again submitted the treaty for ratification to 
the Senate. 
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supportive of the regime.  Several factors impede American support 
for the treaty. 
The first relates to security optimization and the role of nuclear 
weapons in managing U.S. security interests.  The United States has 
argued that the best way to maintain confidence in its inventory is to 
conduct periodic nuclear tests, without which the United States would 
not be able to uncover design, safety, or reliability problems.115  A 
treaty that potentially constrains its ability to maintain its arsenal and 
defend itself properly is unlikely to gain U.S. support.  Some experts 
have argued that the United States can ensure the continuing 
performance of weapons in its stockpile by testing the non-nuclear 
components of the weapons—an activity allowed under the CTBT—
and that the United States has not traditionally relied on such tests 
for maintenance.116  This assessment is potentially useful for assuaging 
concerns about current stockpiles and is consistent with why the 
United States has been able to maintain its moratorium on testing.  It 
does not address, however, the possibility that the United States 
would need to develop new types of weapons, which do require 
testing. 
The second concern of the United States is with regard to 
verification, in particular, that states could conduct tests below the 
threshold of detection.  The implication is that these states would be 
able to enhance their nuclear advantage while remaining a ratifying 
party of the regime.  Without a credible guarantee that other nuclear 
states and states with nuclear ambition will adhere to the provisions 
of the treaty, those who do adhere would be at a relative 
disadvantage.  Some proliferation specialists have noted that 
meaningful tests below the level of detection are not plausible, and 
that only a handful of highly experienced nuclear-weapon states could 
succeed in conducting clandestine tests, and those tests would yield 
limited insight.117  Nonetheless, detection and verification require a 
full implementation of the International Monitoring System, which 
 
 115. See supra note 113. 
 116. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE 
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 20 (2002). 
 117. The National Academy of Sciences noted that the United States, Russia, France, 
China, and the U.K. might be able to succeed in conducting clandestine tests under the 
threshold of detection.  The Committee also noted that such tests would not offer substantial 
insight compared to what these states already know.  See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
supra note 116, at 61-78. 
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requires the participation of other states including those that have not 
ratified the treaty like China and Israel. 
Adherence behavior on the part of the United States appears to 
be motivated by realist concerns of cooperation and defection under 
anarchy.  Without credible assertion that other rival countries will 
comply and that non-adherence will be detected and punished, the 
United States is averse to submitting to adherence.  As one opponent 
of the CTBT has noted, “U.S. ratification would most likely have 
ended up placing dangerous restrictions on the reliability of the 
American nuclear arsenal without similarly restricting the capabilities 
of other nuclear powers, present and future.”118  Concerns with the 
relative advantages of states that defect, and the relative advantage of 
the United States if it enhances its arsenal, have both prohibited the 
United States from ratifying the CTBT. 
3. Validation of Theories.  In summary, states appear to be 
motivated by concern for relative security.  In the absence of a 
perfectly credible verification regime—a reality in an anarchic 
world—states are reluctant to constrain their ability to maintain a 
stable, reliable arsenal.  The effects of anarchy are particularly acute 
for states that are regional adversaries: India and Pakistan, and Israel, 
Egypt, and Iran.  What Brazil and Argentina—two states that can be 
considered regional competitors—show, however, is that just as 
tensions can escalate, making cooperation in the security arena 
prohibitively difficult, they can also de-escalate, creating conditions 
for cooperation.  Over a period of a couple decades, these two 
countries engaged in a series of bilateral confidence-building 
agreements that set the stage for the multilateral regime of the NPT 
and CTBT.  Previous bilateral détente may not be the necessary and 
sufficient condition for broader cooperation in a multilateral treaty, 
but it seems to have worked in the case of Brazil and Argentina.  The 
European countries are arguably protected by the U.S. security 
umbrella, but did in fact sign and ratify in concert, suggesting some 
awareness of the behavior of other regional players.  It appears that 
the other countries are still too concerned with regional security and 
their ability to maximize their security, particularly vis-à-vis 
competitors in the region.  This conclusion would seem to validate 
both the realist and neoliberal hypotheses.  While the general 
 
 118. Robert Kagan & William Kristol, Senate Republicans’ Finest Hour, WEEKLY 
STANDARD, Oct. 25, 1999, at 11. 
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behavior of states would seem to support a realist interpretation, the 
fact that particular states—such as Brazil and Argentina—are able to 
take advantage of the regime would support a neoliberal 
understanding of the reciprocal benefits to be gained by participation 
in the treaty. 
B. The Land Mine Convention 
1. Overview of the Treaty Regime. 
a. Background.  On September 18, 1997, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was signed in Ottawa.119  
This Convention was the result of an unusual series of negotiations.  
Originally, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament had 
taken the lead in working toward the conclusion of a convention.120  In 
1996, however, a number of states and non-governmental 
organizations under the umbrella of the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines launched what came be know as the Ottawa 
process.121  Under the leadership of the Canadian Government, this 
second track moved rapidly toward the conclusion of a Convention 
the following year.  The Convention entered into force on March 1, 
1999, and by December 2004, 144 states had become parties.122  Given 
that this Convention relates to the use of mines in the conduct of 
armed conflict, this agreement squarely falls into the area of high 
politics. 
b. Legal Obligations.  The basic purpose of the Convention was 
the elimination of the use and production of all anti-personnel 
landmines.  Under Article 1 of the treaty,  the parties “undertake 
never in any circumstances” “to use,” “develop, produce, otherwise 
 
 119. CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND 
TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997) 
[hereinafter Mine Ban Treaty]. 
 120. Id. 
 121. This description of the process draws upon ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 644-47 (3d ed. 2002).  For more background on the Land 
Mine Convention, see Maxwell A. Cameron, TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR passim (Maxwell A. 
Cameron, et al., eds., 1998); LANDMINES AND HUMAN SECURITY passim (Richard A. Matthew, 
et. al., eds., 2004). 
 122. See INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, available at 
http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (delineating members, signature 
dates, and entry-into-force dates). 
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acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, 
anti-personnel mines.”123 
Following from this general obligation, the parties are required 
to destroy all anti- personnel mines in their possession or in areas 
under their jurisdiction and control.124  In preparation for this 
destruction, the Convention also requires certain “transparency 
measures.”125  In particular, all parties are required to disclose 
appropriate information relating to the number, location, and types of 
mines under its control, as well as the status of programs to destroy 
such mines.126  The states also agree to take the necessary national 
implementation measures to ensure adherence with the agreement. 
c. Enforcement Mechanisms.  The Convention establishes a 
multi-layered approach to facilitate the enforcement of its provisions.  
First, it authorizes states to file a formal Request for Clarification if 
such state believes that there may be problems relating to the 
adherence of another state.  This request is initially taken up by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall communicate the 
request to the requested state.127  If the requesting state does not 
receive a satisfactory answer through this process, that requesting 
state may take the request to a Meeting of the States Parties.  At such 
a meeting, the States Parties may authorize a fact finding mission to 
the requested states to investigate adherence with the agreement.128  
Under the terms of Article 8, the requested state is legally obligated 
to “grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and 
installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance 
issue could be expected to be collected.”129  Following this mission, the 
States Parties “shall consider all relevant information” and “may 
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the 
compliance issue within a specified period of time.”130  The 
 
 123. Mine Ban Treaty, art. 1.  An anti-personnel mine is defined as “a mine designed to be 
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or 
kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact 
of a Vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not 
considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.”  Id. art. 2(1). 
 124. Id. arts. 3-4. 
 125. Id. arts. 7. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. art. 8. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. art. 8(14). 
 130. Id. art. 8(18). 
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Convention does not, however, provide for any form of binding 
actions on states that refuse to comply with the recommendations of 
the States Parties.  Accordingly, it would seem that the strength of the 
verification/enforcement regime established by the Convention could 
be rated at a “moderate” level. 
d. Effect on Sovereignty.  The most significant effect of the 
Convention on state autonomy is the requirement that states accept 
fact-finding missions.  While this requirement is not as intrusive as the 
inspections regimes contained in some other arms control 
agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention,131 it is 
nonetheless a reasonably intrusive measure.  It would thus make 
sense to rate the infringement on sovereignty at the level of 
“moderate.” 
e. Normativity.  Over the years before and after the Ottawa 
process began, states have seemed to form a strong consensus 
regarding the “morally abhorrent” nature of anti-personnel land 
mines.132  As will be seen in the statements of states, this perception 
seems to cut across a wide-variety of states.  Accordingly, the 
normativity of the Land Mine Convention would seem to be “high.” 
2. Adherence Behavior.  Since the Landmine Convention 
entered into force, there has been a wide disparity in the level of 
adherence from the target states.  Given the indicators of adherence, 
states can roughly be grouped into four categories: very high, high, 
medium, and low. 
At the highest end of the spectrum are Australia, Canada and 
Germany.  These three states were among the leading advocates of 
the treaty and moved quickly to fulfill the provisions of the 
agreement.  Canada, in particular, played the most significant role as 
the convener of the Ottawa Process, and has been a consistent 
champion of the treaty.  Underlying Canadian support for the treaty 
seems to be a belief that landmines are simply immoral weapons.  As 
the Ottawa Process began in 1996, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy explained: 
We have all been struck by the dedication and dynamism brought 
to the discussions by those whose lives have been directly affected 
 
 131. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993). 
 132. See infra notes 133-81 and accompanying text. 
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by AP [anti-personnel] mines.  They have reminded us that the 
issue of AP mines is one of human, not military, security.  Their 
compelling stories challenge our sense of collective responsibility to 
eliminate these terrible weapons.133 
At the Nairobi Review Conference in 2004, Adrienne Clarkson, the 
Governor General of Canada, was even more explicit.  Using words 
like “scourge” and “curse” to refer to landmines, she explained that 
Canada and other states had “decided that we will help each other to 
put an end to these crude and cruel weapons” at the Ottawa 
Conference seven years earlier.134  Clarkson reiterated that these 
states decided then “that the killing and maiming of about 26,000 
people a year was unacceptable.”135  Australia seemed to express a 
similar attitude toward the nature of landmines and has given some 
indication that the supporting the Landmine Treaty was an important 
part of Australian identity.  At the Ottawa Conference signing 
session, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer explained that 
“[s]igning the Ottawa Treaty is the quickest, most absolute way for a 
government to commit itself to this objective, and it is right that 
Australia, with its strong humanitarian record, should take this high 
road to a global landmines ban.”136  He asserted: 
The Australian Government in April 1996 committed Australia to 
support a global ban on anti-personnel landmines and imposed an 
indefinite suspension on the operational use of these weapons by 
the Australian Defence Force, even though Australia - like the 
great majority of the other nations which will sign the Ottawa 
Treaty today and tomorrow - has had no association with the 
indiscriminate or irresponsible use of landmines.137 
 
 133. News Release, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
Canada Offers to Host Treaty Conference to Sign Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines (Oct. 5, 1996), 
available at http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=376785& 
Language=E. 
 134. Adrienne Clarkson, Canadian Governor General, Address at the Nairobi Summit on a 
Mine-Free World: First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.mines.gc.ca/summit/ 
GG_Landmines_Convention_Speech-en.asp). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Address at the Ministerial 
Treaty Signing Conference for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel Landmines and on their Destruction (Dec. 3, 1997) 
(transcript available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1997/lmines_4 
dec97.html). 
 137. Id. 
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In the high range are Argentina, France, Japan, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom.  All these states have generally fulfilled the 
provisions of the treaty and have supported the regime.  These states 
have provided a variety of explanations for their adherence to the 
treaty.  In general, they seem to fall into two broad categories; a 
perception that landmines are so morally repugnant that they must be 
prohibited and a belief that landmines are a major obstacle to 
international development. 
France, for example, notes both issues.  It has described these 
weapons as “inhumane” and has emphasized the development aspect 
of the treaty.138  At the Review Conference in 2004, the delegate from 
France noted that what brought the parties together was a “common 
fight against one of the most cruel scourge [sic] that mankind has ever 
known.”139  He also went on to indicate that one of the major 
problems with landmine proliferation was that it “constitute[d] a 
major factor of destabilization and a hindrance to development.”140  
The Japanese seem to have taken the immoral aspect of the weapons 
to an even greater level, comparing the nature of landmines to the use 
of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II.141  South Africa 
also seems especially concerned about the obstructions to 
development, indicating that a landmine-free Africa is a prerequisite 
for development in that continent.142 
More interesting, however, are those states in the medium range: 
Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.  Brazil and 
Nigeria both signed and ratified the treaty but only moderately 
adhered.  Brazil was slow in its involvement with the Ottawa Process 
 
 138. Xavier Darcos, French Minister of State for Cooperation, Development and 
Francophony, Statement at the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World: First Review 
Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004), 
http://www.reviewconference.org/fileadmin/pdf/review_conference/other_languages/RC_F_Fre
nch/high_level/France_HLS_RC2004_fr.pdf. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Katsuyuki Kawai, Japanese Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Statement at 
The Nairobi Summit on Mine-Free World: First Review Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.reviewconference.org/ 
fileadmin/pdf/review_conference/high_level/Japan_HLS_RC2004.pdf. 
 142. H.E. Mlulecki George, South African Deputy Minister of Defense, Statement at The 
Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World: First Review Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.reviewconference.org/ 
fileadmin/pdf/review_conference/high_level/South_Africa_HLS_RC2004_en.pdf. 
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but ultimately did engage.143  While Brazil destroyed its stockpile of 
mines in January 2003, it retained 16,545 mines for training 
purposes—making it the state possessing the most of such mines.144  
Nigeria was also not initially engaged in the Ottawa Process but with 
the change of regimes in 1999, “Nigeria began making positive 
statements regarding the Mine Ban Treaty.”145  While Nigeria has 
indicated that it destroyed its stockpiles of mines by 2001, there is 
some evidence to the contrary.146  Ukraine is behind both Brazil and 
Nigeria with respect to adherence.  It has signed but not ratified the 
treaty and still has about 6 million mines to destroy.147  The main hold 
up seems to be the lack of funding for such destruction operations.148  
In their public statements, all these states seem to be strongly 
supportive of the treaty regime. 
But in this moderate category, Russia and the United States are 
the most interesting cases.  Neither state has signed or ratified the 
convention, yet they have both exhibited a degree of adherence to the 
treaty.  Why would a state still exhibit some level of adherence to a 
treaty when it has not signed or ratified the treaty?  The United 
States, for example, has indicated that it did not want to be bound by 
the treaty and has made it clear that as a matter of policy, it would 
continue to maintain the right to use “non-persistent”149 anti-
personnel mines indefinitely.150  In a State Department release from 
 
 143. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Brazil, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/brazil. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Nigeria, available at http://www.icbl.org/ 
lm/2004/nigeria. 
 146. In the Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Nigeria states that “slides presented to States 
Parties in May 2002 indicated Nigeria still had antipersonnel mines in stocks.”  Id. 
 147. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Ukraine, available at http://www.icbl.org/ 
lm/2004/ukraine. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Non-persistent mines are those that self-destruct or deactivate after a given time 
period.  See Dept. of Defense, Global Message (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040302.html [hereinafter Global Message]. 
 150. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, United States of America, available at 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/usa.  The Clinton Administration was more favorably disposed 
toward the treaty.  While Clinton did not sign the treaty, his Administration indicated that the 
United States planned to become a party in 2006 as long as certain alternatives were made 
available.  However, as the Landmine Monitor reported: “Following a two-and-one-half year 
review, the Bush Administration announced a new landmine policy on 27 February 2004 that 
abandons the long-held U.S. objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty eventually and instead 
allows the military to retain antipersonnel mines indefinitely. This reverses the previous policy 
announced by the Clinton Administration to join the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006, as long as 
suitable alternatives to antipersonnel mine had been identified and fielded.”  Id. 
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February 2004, the Administration explained that the United States 
will not join the Treaty “because its terms would have required the 
U.S. to give up a needed military capability. . . .  Landmines still have 
a valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military 
operations. . . .  No other weapon currently exists that provides all the 
capabilities provided by landmines.”151 
In essence, the United States refused to sign the treaty purely for 
security reasons; it was regarded as limiting the nation’s flexibility to 
use the military means necessary for its defense.  Not surprisingly, the 
United States was also generally opposed to the Ottawa Process and 
preferred to work through the Committee on Disarmament in the 
initial efforts to secure a treaty.152  Yet despite this initial 
unwillingness to formally become a party to the treaty and renounce 
the use and stockpiling of landmines entirely, it seems as though 
American behavior has changed significantly since the adoption of 
the treaty.  First, the United States made pledges to use only non-
persistent mines.153  Second, the United States “cleared its protective 
minefields at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba in 1999, and 
now claims not to maintain minefields anywhere in the world.”154  
According to the Landmine Monitor Report of 2004, “U.S. mine 
action funding [for demining and other purposes] totaled $421.4 
million between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, the largest total for any 
government.”155  Third, the State Department created Office of 
Humanitarian Demining Programs that subsequently became part of 
the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.156  If the United 
 
 151. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, New United States 
Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers 
(Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ds/sa/lwm/publications/Fact%20Sheet%20(Landmine 
%20Policy).pdf. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Global Message, supra note 149.  In a recent report, the Department of State portrayed 
the Bush Administration’s policy as demonstrating leadership in this area: “The Administration 
developed a new landmine policy that commits us to be the first major military power to stop 
using land mines that are persistent or undetectable to metal detectors. The new policy 
reinforces the long-standing U.S. leadership role in—and a commitment to—curbing the 
humanitarian problems caused by indiscriminate use of landmines and opens the door for 
possible international dialogue on a prohibition on the sale or export of persistent landmines.”  
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Arms Control, The Arms Control Philosophy and 
Accomplishments of the Bush Administration, Bureau of Arms Control, Department of State 
(Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/42200.htm. 
 154. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, United States of America, supra note 150. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  The Landmine Monitor Report noted this development: 
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States is unwilling to ratify the treaty, why would it then adhere to 
any extent? 
An examination of the public statements of the United States 
seems to reveal several reasons for supporting the spirit of the treaty.  
First, although other states have expressed a concern that landmines 
are an impediment to international development, the United States 
has indicated that its demining activities are important to advancing 
that goal.  In a report entitled, To Walk the Earth in Safety, released 
by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department in 
2004, the United States explained its “commitment to help rid the 
world of landmines that threaten civilians around the world.”157  The 
report noted: 
This effort supports the U.S. Strategic Objectives to advance 
sustainable development and global interests by providing a 
humanitarian response to the harmful social and economic effects 
generated by landmines and unexploded ordnance and to advance 
peace and security by promoting regional stability through the use 
of mine action as a confidence-building measure.  Accordingly, the 
United States helps to reduce the number of civilian landmine 
casualties, return refugees and internally displaced persons 
threatened by landmines to their homes and enhance the political 
and economic stability of those countries affected by landmines.158 
It would thus seem that motivations of the United States include a 
desire to promote international development, a belief that regional 
stability will be established if states are less likely to have landmines 
exploding, and a sense that if the United States engages in demining 
efforts, states might be more likely to cooperate with the United 
States in general. 
 
Concurrent with the formation of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, a 
set of “revitalized goals” for how the U.S. as a donor treats requests for humanitarian 
mine action assistance from affected countries and the “measurable goals” by which 
programs are evaluated have been articulated. During the review process leading to 
the new landmine policy, President Bush directed the State Department to develop a 
new strategic plan for the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program. The U.S. 
humanitarian mine action strategic plan will serve to advance humanitarian interests 
and protect the U.S. by promoting regional security. It uses four factors to determine 
to whom and to what degree the U.S. provides assistance: humanitarian need, foreign 
policy interests, efficiency and transparency of the recipient’s national mine action 
program, and the recipient’s commitment to demining. 
Id. 
 157. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal 
& Abatement, The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Mine Action: To Walk the 
Earth in Safety 10 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/ 
2004/37224.htm. 
 158. Id. 
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Russia has also demonstrated a moderate level of adherence.  
Much like the United States, it preferred the efforts undertaken in the 
Conference on Disarmament to the Ottawa Process, and it continues 
to maintain the right to use landmines.  In November of 2003, the 
chief Russian diplomat to a review conference on the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons indicated that “the world without mines 
remains to be our goal.  However, as we repeatedly pointed out, the 
movement to that noble goal should be realistic, we should proceed 
stage-by-stage while ensuring the necessary level of stability.”159  
Russia has also in practice used landmines in Chechnya, Dagestan, 
Tajikistan, and along the Russian-Georgian Border.160 
Despite its use of mines, Russia also became active in demining 
work.  The Landmine Monitor Report noted that “[i]n 2000, the 
government formed a Federal Working Group for Mine Action and 
appointed a special coordinator on humanitarian demining to 
coordinate activities within various state agencies related to 
international humanitarian mine clearance.”161  Subsequently, “[i]n 
June 2003, it was reported that a new Counter Mine Danger Service 
had been established under the Russian Federation Engineer Forces 
to integrate military and civilian mine action-related elements.”162  The 
following November, “[a] Russian official stated . . . that a Center of 
Demining had been established ‘on the basis of the Moscow 
University of Military Engineers in order to train experts in detecting 
and clearing of explosive devices.’”163 
Russia’s unwillingness to become a party to the treaty and to 
fully adhere to its stems both from a belief in the military value of 
landmines and a concern regarding the cost of their destruction.  As 
the Landmine Monitor Report of 2004 explained, “[Russia’s] long-
held reservations to joining the treaty include its perception of the 
utility of antipersonnel mines and of the lack of viable alternatives, 
and its potential inability to meet the financial commitment to destroy 
the country’s considerable stockpile of antipersonnel mines within 
 
 159. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Russia, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/russia 
(citing Anatoly Antonov, Russian Ambassador-at-Large, Statement at the Fifth Annual 
Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Nov. 20, 2003)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Russia, supra note 159. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citing a statement issued by Russia at the CCW Amended Protocol II Conference 
on Nov. 26, 2003). 
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four years, as required by the treaty.”164  Thus, this reflects both a 
realist concern for security but also a simple practical concern that, at 
times, states simply cannot afford to comply with treaty requirements. 
Why, however, would Russia wish to adhere to any aspects of the 
treaty regime?  Based on official statements, Russia seems to be 
concerned about the horrific nature of mines.  In a speech before the 
United Nations Security Council in November 2003, the Russian 
delegate explained: 
The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the whole 
range of problems related to mine action.  We support United 
Nations efforts to mobilize the international community to address 
the issue of the danger posed by mines. Russia is acquainted from 
bitter experience with the tragedy and suffering caused by the 
uncontrolled use of mines. Despite the fact that more than a half a 
century has elapsed since the end of the Second World War, 
Russia’s Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Emergency 
Situations disarms tens of thousands of pieces of unexploded 
ordnance every year.165 
In the low range, which represents states that have done very little to 
adhere to the agreement, are six states: China, Egypt, India, Iran, 
Israel, and Pakistan.  None of these states have signed or ratified the 
agreement, and they seem to be quite far from fulfilling the provisions 
of the treaty.  China was one of the largest producers of landmines 
and had been one of the world’s largest exporters of landmines.166  
While there are indications that China has stopped exporting mines 
and ceased production, the country continues to possess a very large 
stockpile of the weapons.167  Egypt reportedly has large stockpiles of 
landmines and, while it claimed to have ceased export of them in 
2000, the Landmine Monitor concluded that Egypt is still producing 
the weapons.168  India continues to produce and stockpile landmines 
and has “laid large numbers of mines along its border with Pakistan 
between December 2001 and July 2002, in one of the biggest mine-
laying operations anywhere in the world.”169  Iran is in a very similar 
position.  Evidence suggests that Iran continued to produce 
landmines in 1999 and 2000, and the Landmine Monitor noted that 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. UN SCOR, 58th Sess., 4858th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4858 (Nov. 13, 2003) 
(transcribing the statement of Mr. Konuzin, representing the Russian Federation). 
 166. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, China, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/china. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Egypt, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/egypt. 
 169. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, India, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/india. 
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“Iran is believed to maintain minefields along its borders with Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.”170  Israel, likewise, possesses landmines 
and seems to have a number deployed along various borders.171  It 
reportedly ceased production and has “renewed an export 
moratorium until 2005.”172  Pakistan continues to be a manufacturer of 
landmines and has deployed them in a number of cases, including 
along the Indian border.173 
The main reason these states continue to refrain from formal 
participation in the treaty regime is clear.  All acknowledge the 
military utility of landmines.  And in all those cases, they have states 
that are perceived to be hostile or potentially hostile at their borders.  
This view seems clearly reinforced by statements over the years.  Iran, 
for example, had no hesitation declaring in 2003 that “[l]andmines 
continue to be the sole effective means to ensure the minimum 
security requirements of borders in countries with long land 
borders.”174  Similarly, Pakistan has consistently stated “that the use of 
landmines is part of its self-defense strategy and it opposes a ban until 
viable alternatives are developed.” 175  India, which shares the border 
with Pakistan, has taken a virtually identical position.  They will 
continue to possess mines for self-defense, until such times when 
alternative technologies are available.176  These reasons seem perfect 
 
 170. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Iran, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/iran. 
 171. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Israel, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/israel. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Pakistan, available at http://www.icbl.org/ 
lm/2004/pakistan. 
 174. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Iran, supra note 170 (citing The Islamic Republic of 
Iran: Draft Resolution L.43 on “Ottawa Convention,” Permanent Mission of Iran to the United 
Nations, New York, July 2, 2003). 
 175. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Pakistan, supra note 173, (citing Explanation of Vote 
on Draft UNGA Resolution A/C.1/57/L.36 (Oct. 23, 2002); Letter from the Joint Staff 
Headquarters to the Coordinator of the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL), 
Strategic Plan Division, ADCA Directorate, Chaklala Cantonment, (Feb. 14, 2002); Statement 
by Fouzia Nasreen, Ambassador of Pakistan to Nepal, South Asia LM Meeting, (Jan. 29, 2001); 
and Letter to ICBL (Stephen Goose) from Amb. Inam ul Haque, Pakistan Mission to UN, New 
York, (Nov. 15, 1999)). 
 176. India remains committed to the pursuit of the ultimate objective of a non-
discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines in a manner that addresses the 
legitimate defense requirements of states.  India believes that the process of complete 
elimination of anti-personnel mines will be facilitated by the availability of appropriate 
militarily-effective, non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies.  This will enable the 
legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines for operational requirements to be 
addressed, thereby furthering our objective.  See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, India, supra 
note 169 (citing Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Head of Indian Delegation, Statement at the Fifth 
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examples of structural realism.  Because states see landmines as 
necessary for their security, they will not abandon their use as long as 
they have some kind of military utility. 
But even among these states that exhibit low adherence, some of 
them have undertaken certain measures that support the treaty 
regime.  India177 and Pakistan,178 for example, have participated in 
demining efforts throughout the world.  But of this group, China 
seems to stand out as the one state that has become much more 
engaged in the process.  As the Landmine Monitor reported, China 
has taken a number of steps since 2003: 
China, together with the China Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association and the Australian Network of ICBL, hosted the 
“Humanitarian Mine/UXO Clearance Technology and 
Cooperation Workshop” at Kunming on 26-28 April 2004.  China 
joined the donors’ Mine Action Support Group.  In November 
2003, an official stated that China has thus far destroyed over 
400,000 old mines that did not meet the technical requirements of 
CCW Amended Protocol II.  China has reiterated its support for 
“the ultimate goal of a total ban on antipersonnel mines.”  In 
December 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross, in 
cooperation with the Red Cross Society of China, established a 
prosthetic center in Kunming.179 
China has also made a number of statements in support of a ban on 
antipersonnel mines.  In September of 2003, an official noted that: 
[t]he Chinese government attaches great importance to 
humanitarian issues and supports the efforts by the international 
community in addressing the humanitarian problems caused by 
landmines. . . .  There is no denying that banning antipersonnel 
mines (APLs) can be the ultimate way to prevent them from 
injuring civilians and address the humanitarian concerns arising 
 
Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (Nov. 26, 2003)). 
 177. “India reports that its Corps of Engineers has over many years assisted with UN-
sponsored mine clearance programs in Cambodia, Bosnia, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.”  Id. 
 178. Pakistan contributed to mine action operations in Afghanistan (1989-91), Kuwait (post-
1991 Gulf War), Cambodia (1992-93), Angola (1995-98), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Western 
Sahara, mostly as part of the U.N. peacekeeping contingents.  In November 2003 Pakistan said 
that it was assisting with demining operations in Lebanon, Sierra Leone and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Pakistan, supra note 173. 
 179. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, China, supra note 166. 
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thereof.  To those states that have chosen to do so, we express our 
respect and appreciation.180 
And in a statement before the United Nations Security Council, the 
Chinese representative explained: “Although China has yet to accede 
to the Ottawa Convention, we identify ourselves with the purposes of 
the Convention and support the ultimate goal of a total ban on 
antipersonnel mines.”181  While it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
from China’s willingness to express some level of support for the 
treaty regime, the rhetoric seems to connect to some of the views 
expressed by other states about the overall nature of these weapons. 
3. Validation of Theories.  In reviewing the motivations for 
adherence and non-adherence, there are two dominate theoretical 
explanations: structural realism and constructivism.  Realism seems to 
explain why states would refuse to sign and ratify.  States like the 
United States, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Israel perceive the 
treaty to be too constraining on their right to defend themselves.  
Those states that have signed, ratified, and generally adhered to the 
legal obligations contained in the treaty seem to be motivated by a 
belief that these weapons are inhumane.  This is linked to the notion 
that states’ identities would lead them to do away with such weapons.  
Indeed, even countries like the United States that have not signed 
and ratified, still adhere to much of the treaty, perhaps because of this 
same sense of identity.  Hegemonic stability theory also seems to be 
consistent with the behavior of the United States. 
C. The World Trade Organization 
1. Overview of the Treaty Regime. 
a. Background.  The World Trade Organization was 
established in 1995 following the conclusion of the so-called 
“Uruguay Round” of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade182 
 
 180. Id. (citing Fu Cong, Deputy Director-General of Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department, Statement at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Sept. 19, 
2003)). 
 181. Id. (citing Zhang Yishan, quoted in UN Security Council, S/PV.4858, 4858th meeting, 
“Agenda: The importance of mine action for peacekeeping operations” (Nov. 13, 2003)). 
 182. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter General Agreement or GATT]. 
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(GATT) negotiations.183  The Organization was formalized in the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO 
Charter),184 which establishes the structure, scope, and functions of 
the organization.  The purpose of the Organization is to provide an 
institutional framework for the GATT and to expand into a variety of 
other areas, including services and intellectual property.185  As a 
consequence, a number of other agreements set the rule base for the 
WTO.  Of particular importance are the GATT, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),186 and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).187  
Underlying these agreements are the principles of Most-Favored 
Nation Treatment and National Treatment.  These agreements and 
other related ones set forth detailed procedures for reviewing state 
trade policies and resolving disputes arising under these 
arrangements. 
Of the treaty regimes explored in this Article, the WTO is unique 
with respect to its membership.  Currently, there are 148 members 
within the organization.  What is unusual is that one of its most 
powerful members is not a state, but rather the “European 
Communities,”—as the European Union is referred to in WTO 
parlance.  It participated as a member of the GATT Rounds since 
1960 and was a founding member of the WTO.188  During 
negotiations, it behaves as a unitary actor and, as will be discussed 
below, participates in the dispute-settlement mechanism.  Of the 
target states, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are 
members of the EU.189 
 
 183. On the development of the GATT and the origins of the WTO, see JOHN H. JACKSON, 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS (MIT Press 2d ed. 1997). 
 184. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 185. See overview of WTO website, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 186. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter 
GATS]. 
 187. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994) [hereinafter  TRIPS]. 
 188. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 249 n.17 (2004). 
 189. It is also interesting to note that “Chinese Taipei,” the Republic of China, is also a 
member of the WTO. 
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b. Legal Obligations.  The two main substantive key obligations 
embodied in the agreements establishing the rule base for the WTO 
are Most Favored Nation Treatment and National Treatment.  Most 
Favored Nation Treatment, as established in the GATT, GATS, and 
TRIPS agreements, means that states pledge to treat all other states 
as well as they treat their best trading partner.  The GATT, for 
example, provides: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with 
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation 
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.190 
Similar provisions are echoed in GATS191 and TRIPS.192  The second 
main substantive obligation is National Treatment.  In essence, 
National Treatment means that the parties must treat non-nationals 
in the same manner as nationals.  The TRIPS notes, with a few 
established exceptions, “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals 
of other Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to 
its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual 
property[.]”193 
c. Enforcement Mechanisms.  In addition to these main 
substantive obligations, the agreements falling under the umbrella of 
the WTO also establish extensive procedures with respect to dispute 
resolution.  One of the agreements reached at the Uruguay Round 
was the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).194  This agreement provides for the 
establishment of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which oversees 
complaints about non-adherence made by states.  In the first instance, 
 
 190. GATT art. 1. 
 191. GATS art. 2. 
 192. TRIPS art. 4. 
 193. Id. art. 3. 
 194. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1225 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].  
On the settlement of disputes under the WTO, see Steinberg, supra note 188. 
03__AREND.DOC 8/1/2006  3:02 PM 
382 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:331 
states are to attempt to present their complaints directly to other 
states during informal consultations.  If those consultations fail, the 
complaining state may request the creation of a panel.  Once the 
panel reaches a conclusion, it files a report that is then submitted to 
the DSB for adoption.  Following the adoption of the panel report, a 
party to the dispute may take the matter to the Standing Appellate 
Body for review. 
The status of the recommendations of the panel and Appellate 
Body is somewhat unclear.  The DSU does not explicitly state that 
such recommendations are binding upon states.195  But, as John 
Jackson observes, “[w]hen one analyzes the DSU . . . it is possible to 
find a number of separate clauses that in context seem to strongly 
imply or ‘add up to’ the obligation to conform to panel/appellate 
report[s] in violation cases.”196 
But perhaps one of the most significant enforcement provisions 
established under the WTO is the allowance for retaliation by an 
aggrieved state.  Under Article 22 of the DSU, if a state fails to 
comply with a decision brought through the dispute settlement 
procedures, the complaining state “may request authorization from 
the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.”197  In 
other words, the state has the right to effectively engage in a 
“reprisal” against the non-compliant state.  Given these extensive 
procedures for the enforcement of the regime, the strength of the 
verification/enforcement arrangement established by the WTO can 
be rated at a “high” level. 
d. Effect on Sovereignty.  The World Trade Organization and 
its related agreements have had a profound effect on the autonomy of 
states.  Because of the complex linkages in trade, services, and 
intellectual property, the Organization connects every state and 
makes it very difficult for them to behave outside the treaty regime 
without suffering repercussions.  In particular, because complaining 
states have the right to ask to revoke concessions or other obligations 
 
 195. John Jackson explains the difficulty: “One interesting question arising in the context of 
the DSU is whether a party that has been the subject of a complaint for a violation case has an 
international legal obligation to follow the recommendations or determinations of the panel 
report or appellate report that results from the process. Unlike other international tribunal 
proceedings, such as the World Court, the DSU does not make this entirely explicit.”  JACKSON, 
supra note 183, at 126. 
 196. Id. 
 197. DSU art. 22. 
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they may have granted to a violating state, reciprocal enforcement 
can take place in the absence of a formal centralized enforcement 
body.  As a consequence, the infringement of the regime on the 
sovereignty of states can be rated as “high.” 
e. Normativity.  It is very difficult to evaluate the normativity of 
the WTO regime.  Even though certain norms such as “free trade,” 
“most favored nation” status, and “national treatment” underlie the 
legal obligations of the regime, there is no clear evidence that these 
principles enjoy any kind of moral efficacy.  In fact, indications seem 
to suggest that the WTO was established under the strong influence 
of the United States and the European Union, acting to promote their 
own interests.198  While it could be argued that the authoritativeness 
of the regime is high inasmuch as the WTO principles were those 
found in the GATT of 1947 and had thus been a part of international 
law, the difficulty of subsequent efforts to incorporate these principles 
in other areas—such as agriculture—would call into question their 
authoritativeness.  It also seems that there may not be universal 
agreement about the fairness of the regime.  Nonetheless, as noted 
earlier, the WTO has extensive membership and a number of other 
states seeking to join the regime, all of which would seem to indicate 
a widespread level of legitimacy. 199  As a consequence of these 
conflicting indicators, the normativity of the regime seems uncertain. 
2. Adherence Behavior.  Given the empirical analysis, states fall 
into three categories: high, medium, and low.  Thirteen states fall into 
the high range: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, 
France, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United 
Kingdom.  Two actors fall into the medium range: the European 
Community and the United States.  And three states fall into the low 
range: Iran, Russia, and Ukraine.200 
 
 198. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 199. We are indebted to our colleague Gustavo Adolfo Flores-Macias for noting this factor 
and assisting in the formulations of this section. 
 200. These determinations were made based on the parties’ willingness to comply with the 
provisions of the WTO agreements.  The three states in the low range have not yet become 
parties to the WTO.  The EC and the United States are listed in the medium range because in 
both cases, these two parties have had adverse decisions by the dispute settlement mechanism, 
have failed to comply with those decisions, and have had sanctions authorized against them.  
The states in the high range have complied with the provisions of the WTO and have ultimately 
carried out any decisions by the dispute settlement bodies. 
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Adherence to the WTO regime has been quite strong among the 
target states.  From the perspective of the most basic indicator of 
adherence—signature and ratification, only three of the target 
states—Iran, Russia, and Ukraine—are not parties to the WTO 
regime.  And these states are seeking membership.  When a state 
makes such an application, the first positive step is the establishment 
of a “working party.”  In the case of Iran, however: 
[D]iscussions through the period under review made clear that 
although a large part of the membership continued to be supportive 
of an early and positive action on this request on the basis of the 
provisions in Article XII of the WTO Agreement, there was no 
consensus at this time to accept Iran’s request and to set up a 
working party for this purpose.201 
With respect to other indicators of adherence, the WTO has a 
different type of treaty regime than the others examined.  First, as 
noted above, the WTO is an international organization that imposes 
certain legal obligations on the parties and provides a comprehensive 
dispute settlement mechanism for resolving questions relating to 
adherence with those provisions.  Second, the WTO also serves as a 
framework for on-going trade negotiations seeking to implement the 
basic free-trade principles of the organization in other substantive 
areas.  Accordingly, adherence to the provisions of the regime needs 
to be understood both in terms of compliance with existing legal 
obligations and the willingness to participate in these on-going 
negotiations. 
From the perspective of general adherence, one of the strongest 
indicators of adherence is the willingness of states to engage and 
accept the dispute settlement mechanism established by the 
Organization.  Since the WTO was established in 1995, 330 
complaints were brought to the dispute settlement body.  Not 
surprisingly, the target states are among the most significant users of 
the procedure.202  The most frequent user of the system was the 
United States, bringing eighty cases and serving as a respondent in 
eighty-eight.  It was followed by the European Communities, bringing 
sixty-eight cases and responding to fifty-one.  Canada was next with 
twenty-six complaints brought, and thirteen cases as respondent.  
 
 201. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep05_e.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL 
REPORT 2005]. 
 202. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF DISPUTES CASES, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (number of cases is as of Nov. 
2005) (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
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Brazil brought twenty-two cases and was a respondent in twelve.  
India brought sixteen cases and was a respondent in seventeen.  Japan 
brought twelve and was a respondent in fourteen.  Argentina brought 
nine cases and was a respondent in fifteen.  Australia brought five 
cases and has been a respondent in seven.  The other states have been 
involved in relatively few cases: China brought one and was a 
respondent in one; Egypt was a respondent in four; France was a 
respondent in two; Pakistan brought three cases and was a 
respondent in one case; South Africa was a respondent in two cases; 
and Great Britain was a respondent in one case.  Given this large 
number of cases brought before the WTO, compliance has been 
remarkable.  As the 2005 Report notes: 
Members have, in general, implemented the recommendations and 
rulings made by the panels and by the Appellate Body in the 
‘reasonable period of time’ determined under Article 21.3 of the 
DSU.  This is an achievement and a success; the WTO Members 
believe in the WTO dispute settlement system and respect it.203 
In the first decade of the WTO’s existence, there have been only 
seven cases in which one of the parties refused to implement the 
decisions of the panel or Appellate Body, and the Dispute Settlement 
Body authorized retaliation by the complaining state.  Interestingly 
enough, all of these cases involve one or more of the target states.  
The first was brought by the United States and Canada against the 
EC for its ban on meat and meat products, known as the EC-
Hormones case.204  Based on the authorization, both Canada and the 
United States took retaliatory measures.  The second was brought by 
the United States and Ecuador for a banana regime set up by the EC, 
known as the EC-Bananas III case.205  In that case, even though 
Ecuador was authorized to suspend concessions, the parties were able 
to resolve the dispute before such action was undertaken.  The third 
case was brought by Canada against Brazil and related to export 
financing for aircraft, known as the Brazil-Aircraft case.206  The fourth 
case was brought by the EC against the United States and related to 
 
 203. ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 201, at 145. 
 204. Arbitrator’s Decision, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999). 
 205. Appellate Body Report, European Communities Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas III]. 
 206. Panel Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/RW/2 
(July 26, 2001) [hereinafter Brazil Aircraft]. 
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Foreign Sales Corporations.207  The fifth case was brought by Brazil 
against Canada and dealt with export credit and loan guarantees for 
aircraft.  The sixth case was brought by the EC against the United 
States for the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act.  In that case, the EC was 
concerned that the Anti-Dumping Act208 violated the obligations of 
the United States under the WTO.  The Bush Administration 
essentially agreed with this claim and undertook efforts to repeal the 
Act.  But those efforts have, to date, been unsuccessful and the 
United States remains in violation.  Some aspects of the case went on 
to arbitration and despite a finding for the EC, they have not yet 
suspended concessions.  Finally, the seventh case209 was brought by 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EC, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico 
against the United States because of the U.S.-Offset Act, the so-
called Byrd Amendment.210 
Given the total number of cases brought before the WTO, the 
rate of compliance seems extraordinarily high.  And what is perhaps 
most significant is that even in those cases where states disagreed with 
the rules of the Dispute Settlement Body, they still actively engaged 
the process.  In the case of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, the executive 
branch even worked to attempt to secure new legislation that would 
put the country in compliance with the WTO obligations.  What has 
not been seen at the WTO is the kind of behavior that a structural 
realist might expect—states have not left the organization or seriously 
threatened to leave when faced with an adverse decision.  Instead, 
they have worked within the organization to make their case, 
 
 207. Arbitrator’s Decision, United States Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 
2002) [hereinafter FSC Article 22.6 Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States Tax 
Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW  (Jan. 14, 2002). 
 208. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, tit. VII, §801, 39 Stat. 798-99 (1916) (15 U.S.C. 72) (2000 & 
Supp. II 2004)) [hereinafter 1916 Act]. 
 209. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000, WT/DS217, 234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003); see Jesse Klaproth, Comment, Decision by the 
Arbitrator—United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: Payback is for 
the Byrds; Arbitrator Allows Eight Countries to Sanction the United States for Application of the 
Byrd Amendment, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401 (2005). 
 210. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §1675c) (2004)) [hereinafter Byrd Amendment].  For a discussion of the 
Byrd Amendment, see Clarie Hervey, Note, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade 
Politics at the WTO, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131 (2004); Meredith Schutzman, 
Note, Antidumping and the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: A Renewed 
Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1069 (2004). 
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challenge rulings, seek time extensions, compromises, and almost 
always comply at the end of the day. 
In addition to this indicator of adherence, another way in which 
adherence with the WTO regime has been demonstrated is through 
the participation of member states in the on-going negotiations on a 
variety of other trade issues.  Since the Organization was formally 
established, there have been five ministerial conferences that have 
sought to strengthen the WTO regime.  The most significant 
development from these conferences was the adoption of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) in Doha, Qatar in November of 2001.211  
The DDA set the agenda for subsequent ministerial conferences and 
the framework for negotiations.  Although efforts to fully implement 
the Doha agenda have been slower than anticipated, the target states 
have all continued to be actively engaged and invested in the 
regime.212  If this adherence behavior seems so strong, why has this 
been the case?  Why have states chosen to follow the requirements of 
the WTO? 
The WTO regime is perhaps the quintessential neoliberal 
regime.  The WTO seeks to create a regime in which all the parties 
are able to realize their long-term economic interests through a rule-
based, transparent system with highly sophisticated enforcement 
mechanisms.  In examining the many statements made by members 
and observer states about the Organization, this motivation seems to 
be most consistent among the target states.  For example, several 
statements made at the most recent Ministerial Conference held in 
Cancún, Mexico in 2003 clearly reflect a neoliberal understanding of 
the WTO.  The Japanese Minster for Foreign Affairs explained: 
The WTO accords us with a set of rules which ensures that the 
benefits of trade liberalization will be shared by all, including 
developing countries.  It also constitutes a rule-based system where 
the strongest is not necessarily assured of reaping benefits but 
where a fairer distribution of benefits is secured.  This world body 
provides us with a universal platform that integrates diverse 
Members and prevents us from falling into the trap of the 
compartmentalization of world trade through the proliferation of 
regional trade agreements.  What we should aim to achieve through 
 
 211. For an overview of the Doha Development Agenda, see WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, NEGOTIATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE DOHA 
AGENDA, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). 
 212. See the International Chamber of Commerce’s comment on the slow pace of Doha: 
ICC Secretary General stresses need for progress as trade negotiators meet in Geneva, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/iccdcbd/index.html. 
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the Doha Development Agenda, is to strengthen this system to 
expand world trade in a balanced way.213 
Similarly, the Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Industry, 
Trade, Labor and Communications explained that the delegates 
“must bear in mind and follow the core principles that led the WTO 
and the multilateral trading system to consistent and progressive 
liberalization throughout the years namely: a rule-based system; 
consensus-based decision-making mechanism; non-discrimination; 
transparency; progressive liberalization; and special and differential 
treatment for developing countries.”214  Almost as if he was reading 
from a neoliberal article on absolute gains, the British Minister for 
Trade, Investment and Foreign Affairs spoke about a need for “[a] 
properly functioning, multilateral trading system, based on consensus 
and enforceable rules, provides all countries, large and small, with the 
potential to pursue those opportunities and increase their 
prosperity.”215 
The United States has also echoed a neoliberal understanding of 
the benefits reaped from the WTO.  In a speech delivered in May of 
2004, for example, United States Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick made it clear that a rule-based system of free trade provided 
benefits to all states, but was clearly a system of reciprocal sacrifice 
and benefit.  Zoellick explained that “we must seek balanced 
solutions that involve give and take from everyone.”216  “We know,” 
Zoellick continued, “that if we move forward together, all our nations 
will be better off.”217  In the spirit of trade-offs, Zoellick 
acknowledged that the United States has made certain sacrifices in 
exchange for the benefits of a free-trade regime and other developed 
countries should do the same.218  Zoellick explained that “[t]he 
 
 213. H.E. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Statement by Japan at the World Trade Organization 
Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/23 (Sept. 11, 2003), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/statements_e/st23.pdf. 
 214. H.E. Ehud Olmert, Statement by Israel at the World Trade Organization Ministerial 
Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/45, (Sept. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/statements_e/st45.pdf. 
 215. Mike O’Brien, Statement by United Kingdom at the World Trade Organization 
Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/11, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/statements_e/st11.pdf. 
 216. Robert Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, A Strategic Opportunity for 
Trade, Address at the Salon de Boffrands du Senat (May 13, 2004), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/USTR_Zoellick_Sp
eeches/2004/A_Strategic_Opportunity_for_Trade.html. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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present openness of the United States is reflected, in part, through 
our $542 billion current account deficit; with a surplus of imports over 
exports of that magnitude, our market cannot be too hard to 
access.”219  He continued by noting: 
President Bush has been clear that the United States will continue 
to stand for openness, dynamism, and growth.  He knows America 
needs to open new markets to create new jobs for workers at home.  
He also knows that more open trade is critical to offer developing 
countries the opportunity to move beyond the dependency of the 
past.  The Doha negotiations remain the central goal of our trade 
strategy.  The President’s strong commitment to the free trade 
agenda, even in the midst of an election year, should bolster the 
commitments of those who wonder whether America is serious in 
its offers to eliminate agricultural export subsidies, slash trade-
distorting farm subsidies, cut drastically the tariffs on goods and 
agriculture, and expand services trade.  We mean what we say.220 
Zoellick then went on to emphasize that “we need more help from 
other important developed nations, too,”221 and called upon the 
European Union222 and Japan223 in particular to make certain 
sacrifices.  Hegemonic stability theory may also underlie U.S. and— 
EC adherence to the regime.  When the WTO was being established 
in 1995, the United States and the EC exerted a tremendous amount 
of influence vis-à-vis the other participants in the GATT.224  Both 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. (“[T]he world will depend on Europe remaining an engaged leader in international 
trade[.]”). 
 223. Id. (“Japan should play a role in Doha more commensurate with the size of its 
economy and its place in the global trading system.”). 
 224. Richard Steinberg provided a quick summary of the role played by the U.S. and the EC 
in the establishment of the WTO: 
The European Communities and the United States have dominated GATT/WTO 
decision making since the 1960s.  Their capacity to bring about constitutional change is 
illustrated by the successful EC-U.S. effort to close the Uruguay Round through a 
legal-political  maneuver that imposed various agreements on weaker powers.  Closure 
was achieved by employing the enormous market power of the European 
Communities and the United States, whose markets make up about 65 percent of the 
combined gross domestic product of WTO members.  Upon the conclusion of the 
round, the European Communities and the United States entered into the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, which included the GATT 1994 and its 
most-favored-nation (MFN guarantee, and required adherence to all the WTO 
multilateral agreements, including TRIPS, which most developing countries had 
previously refused to sign.  Shortly thereafter, the European Communities and the 
United States withdrew from GATT 1947, disengaging from that agreements MFN 
commitment to developing countries.  This maneuver, which closed the Uruguay 
Round by means of a single undertaking, presented the developing countries with a 
fait accompli: either sign on to the entire WTO package or lose the legal basis for 
continued access to the enormous European and U.S. markets. From the time the 
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players sought to create a trade regime that would lock in place rules 
that were seen to be in their interests.  As Richard Steinberg notes, 
the United States was particularly desirous of moving away from the 
more diplomatic approach to dispute resolution that existed under 
the GATT and creating a more legalized approach that would affirm 
important aspects of the American approach to trade: 
The switch from GATT DSU to automatic, binding dispute 
resolution and the establishment of an Appellate Body were seen 
by the United States as an opportunity to foster compliance with a 
set of comprehensive substantive commitments that would result 
from the Uruguay Round. The United States considered it useful to 
implement a legalized dispute settlement process that could 
culminate in the authorized withdrawal of concessions for 
noncompliance because it would legitimize the imposition of 
retaliatory sanctions in cases of noncompliance that were central to 
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.  Thus, the United States was 
careful to condition its support for legalization of dispute 
settlement on the establishment of detailed, substantive 
commitments that it supported.225 
In short, this could be considered classic hegemonic behavior.  A 
power state —and a powerful non-state—comply with a regime 
because it embodies rules that promote their interests.  A theory that 
seems conspicuously absent from the discussions surrounding the 
WTO is constructivism.  There is very little in the public statements 
that would indicate that adherence to the WTO was based on a real 
sense of identity.  While there are references to the importance of 
promoting a regime of free trade, they seem to be couched in the 
neoliberal understanding of the reciprocal benefits—even if only in 
the long term—of such a regime.  Strangely, there does seem to be at 
least one outlier in this regard—Ukraine.  As noted earlier, Ukraine 
is not yet a member of the WTO, but has observer status with the 
organization.  At the 2003 ministerial conference, the Ukrainian First 
Vice Minister and Minister of Finance argued that “[m]aintaining, 
strengthening and developing the WTO system are pre-conditions for 
further stable development of the world economy, which, in turn, will 
form the basis for the future development of world society.”226  He 
 
transatlantic powers agreed to that approach in 1990, the definitively dominated the 
agenda-setting process, that is, the formulation and drafting of texts that would be 
difficult to amend. 
Steinberg, supra note 188, at 265 (internal citations omitted). 
 225. Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted). 
 226. Nykola Azarov, Statement by Ukraine at the World Trade Organization Ministerial 
Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/159 (Sept. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Statement 
by Nykola Azarov]. 
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explained that “[t]he Doha Round documents stress that 
liberalization is not an end in itself, but only an instrument to ensure 
the stable [sic] consensual development of society and the 
enhancement of the well-being of people in all countries of the 
world.”227  In summary, therefore, it seems as though adherence to the 
WTO regime is explained best by a combination of neoliberal 
institutionalism and hegemonic stability theory. 
D. The Kyoto Protocol 
1. Overview of the Treaty Regime 
a. Background228.  With the objective of addressing climate 
change, the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol229 sought to create a 
framework for intergovernmental efforts designed to reduce carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases thought to create global warming.  
Despite some initial and continuing disagreement among key parties 
as to specific emissions targets, enforcement mechanisms, and goals 
for developing countries, the agreement was negotiated in December 
1997, and went into force on 16 February 2005.230 
b. Legal Obligations.  Under the provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Annex I, states that have ratified the Protocol are expected 
to cap emissions of greenhouse gases at roughly 95% of 1990 levels by 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. For a general discussion of the background of the Kyoto Protocol, see DAVID G. 
VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL 
WARMING 14 (2001); John F. Temple, Note, The Kyoto Protocol: Will it Sneak up on the U.S.?, 
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 213 (2002); see also Understanding Climate Change: A Beginner’s Guide 
to the U.N. Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, http://www.wwnorton.com/college/ 
chemistry/chemconnections/Warming/pages/begconkp.html. 
 229. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32, 40 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].  The Protocol was thus additional 
to the Convention, which was concluded in 1992.  United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, June 20, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter Framework Convention]. 
 230. In order for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, it required ratification by countries 
representing at least fifty-five percent of the total CO2 emissions for 1990 of the thirty-eight 
Annex I countries.  Annex I countries are the developed countries subject to emissions ceilings. 
They are established in Annex I to the Framework Convention. It lists the following states and 
organizations: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark European Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland,  Ireland, Italy,  Japan,  Latvia, Lithuania,  Luxembourg , Netherlands,  New 
Zealand,  Norway, Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russian Federation,  Spain,  Sweden,  
Switzerland,  Turkey,  Ukraine,  Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and United States of America.  
Framework Convention, supra note 229, Annex I. 
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2008-2012.231  As an intermediate step, each Annex I party was 
expected, “by 2005, [to] have made demonstrable progress in 
achieving its commitments under this Protocol.”232  To facilitate 
meeting these goals in the aggregate, the agreement proposed the 
establishment of an emissions trading system in which states under 
their respective quotas would sell their rights to other states needing 
additional capacity.  Such a system would benefit states like Russia 
and Ukraine, whose economies collapsed after 1990, and would hurt 
developing countries that had lower levels of production in 1990 but 
had begun to develop and required fossil fuels. 
c. Enforcement Mechanisms.  The initial drafting of the Kyoto 
Protocol did not address compliance and enforcement issues.  Article 
17 indicated that the first session of the Conferences of the Parties 
(COP) would “approve appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance. . . .  
Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding 
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this 
Protocol.”233  Amendments, as indicated in Article 20, would require 
approval by three-fourths of the parties, and the compliance 
amendment would only be binding for those states that had ratified 
the amendment.234  In other words, compliance enforcement with 
‘binding consequences’ would not be a component of Kyoto. 
All parties agreed that effective compliance is a sine qua non for 
effectively reducing emissions, but agreeing on compliance 
mechanisms proved to be a thornier issue.  Finally, in 2001, four years 
after the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, parties agreed on a “penalty” 
for non-compliance that increased the percentage by which a country 
would be required to cut emissions.235  In spite of the agreement on 
 
 231. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 229, art.3(1). 
 232. Id. art. 3(2). 
 233. Id. art. 17. 
 234. Id. art. 20. 
 235. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh, 
Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, 64, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf; Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, COP 7 and the 
Marrakesh Accords, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/compliance/items/3024.php 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006) (“If, at the end of this period, a Party’s emissions are still greater than 
its assigned amount, it must make up the difference in the second commitment period, plus a 
penalty of 30%.  It will also be barred from ‘selling’ under emissions trading and, within three 
months, it must develop a compliance action plan detailing the action it will take to make sure 
that its target is met in the next commitment period.”). 
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penalties for non-compliance, there are several problems with the 
enforcement of these penalties.  First, failure to pay the penalty in the 
second control period (2013-2017) results in a new penalty for the 
third control period.236  If the state was unable or unwilling to pay in 
the first period, it would probably be less able or willing to pay once 
an additional penalty was levied.  Second, the penalty increases the 
cost of participating in emissions reductions, which makes either 
withdrawal or failure to ratify an amendment more likely.  Lastly, 
compliance is not legally binding except by amendment; those 
countries unlikely to comply will also be those unlikely to ratify the 
amendment. 
The compliance regime designed to “facilitate, promote, and 
enforce adherence to the Protocol’s commitments,” consists of a 
Facilitative and Enforcement Branch.237  The former provides advice 
and assistance intended to help parties meet their commitments, and 
the latter determines whether an Annex I party has met its emission 
target.  If the Enforcement Branch finds a Party in non-compliance, it 
will make a public declaration, including reference to any 
consequences.  The Party has a one-hundred-day window to enter 
into compliance, possibly by trading emissions permits, and take 
remedial action in the second commitment period. 238  Due to the 
weakness of this arrangement for verification/enforcement, it can be 
rated at the “low” level. 
d. Effect on Sovereignty.  Meeting the targets specified in Kyoto 
requires enormous government commitment and sponsorship, since 
reductions are set against a baseline year of 1990.  For the United 
States to meet its obligations of a seven percent reduction compared 
to 1990, it would have to reduce its projected 2008 emissions by 
twenty to thirty percent, an ambitious endeavor.239  Such reductions 
require some sort of domestic intervention, as the trend continues 
upward.  Suggested mechanisms include subsidies for industries to 
research alternative fuels, for individuals to drive alternative-energy 
vehicles, or for the government to purchase emissions rights from 
other countries able to sell theirs.  While some of these changes have 
been suggested for purposes of clean air at the domestic level and 
 
 236. Statement by Nykola Azarov, supra note 226. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Congressional Research Service, Susan R. Fletcher, Global Climate Change Treaty: 
The Kyoto Protocol, Order Code 98-2 (Mar. 6, 2000). 
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energy independence, the ambitiousness of the reductions well 
exceeds the pace at which governments would otherwise adopt these 
measures.  The consequence is an infringement on the policies of 
domestic governments, an infringement of domestic autonomy.  
States such as Russia and Ukraine, whose emissions levels are already 
below 1990 levels, would not be required to modify energy practices, 
meaning that their autonomy is not as impacted by ratification of and 
adherence to Kyoto.  All other states that have ratified must modify 
domestic practices to be in compliance.  It would thus seem that the 
infringement upon the sovereignty imposed by the regime should be 
classified as “high.” 
e. Normativity.  Even though there has been a growing 
international concern about environmental degradation, the 
normativity of the Kyoto Protocol does not seem to be particularly 
high.  Because there are many differences of opinion about the 
science relating to climate change, it is difficult to conclude that there 
is any kind of consensus about the moral value of the regime.  
Moreover, because developing states are excluded from the 
requirements of the Protocol, there has been a strong perception by 
states such as the United States that the regime would operate in an 
unfair, discriminatory fashion.240  As a consequence, it would seem 
that the normativity of the regime should be valued at a “low” level. 
2. Adherence Behavior.  Given this analysis, states seem to fall 
into three categories: high, medium, and low.  Five states fall into the 
high range: France, Germany, Japan, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom.  Three states fall into the medium range: Canada, Russia, 
and South Africa.  Eleven states fall into the low range: Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and the United States.241 
What makes the Kyoto Protocol different from the other treaties 
is exclusion of some countries considered to be great or regional 
powers.  Annex I countries consist of mainly the European Union, 
Russia, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States.  Annex I 
excludes developing countries, into which the negotiators placed 
China, India, and Brazil, who are large and ever-increasing producers 
 
 240. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 241. This ranking is based on the authors’ examination of the states’ fulfillment of 
provisions, institutional investment and domestic support for the overall provisions of the treaty. 
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of greenhouse gases.242  It was the Annex I countries that were 
required to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force.  The EU states, 
Canada, and Japan represented the early ratifiers of the treaty, all 
signing it in 2002.  Following this early set of ratifications, the treaty 
stalled, requiring the ratification of either Russia or the United States 
to enter into force.  Russia ratified in November 2004 and the treaty 
officially entered into force on February 16, 2005.  Annex I countries 
that have not ratified include Australia and the United States. 
More interesting than ratification behavior, however, is behavior 
with respect to other indicators of adherence.  Since Kyoto requires 
emission reductions between 2008 and 2012, it is impossible at this 
time to assess fulfillment of provisions.  It is, however, possible to 
assess whether countries are on target to fulfill those provisions.  
Countries that have been most successful in meeting emissions 
reductions are the former Soviet Republics whose economies 
collapsed after the 1990 disintegration of the Soviet Union.243  The less 
productive economies have consumed less energy, naturally resulting 
in lower emissions compared to the base year of 1990.244  Russia in 
particular, an initial holdout to the treaty, eventually ratified it in 
December 2004, recognizing that it would benefit from any emissions 
 
 242. These three countries have all ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  Since they are not Annex I 
countries, however, they are not subject to emissions limitations or reductions as are those states 
in Annex I that have ratified.  For a discussion on the Annex I states and exemptions for non-
Annex I countries, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).  For a 
discussion of the increasing emissions from developing countries, see Indrajit Basu, Greenbacks 
Waft in with Greenhouse Gases, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 7, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/ 
atimes/South_Asia/GD07Df04.html. 
 243. Since fossil fuels are used as the energy base for economic development, there has 
tended to be a direct relationship between economic development and greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Collapse of an economy would therefore be correlated with a dramatic decrease in 
emissions, which has been the case for former Soviet republics or satellites.  See, e.g., Alexander 
Golub and Benito Muller, Kyoto’s Future Lies in Putin’s Hands, MOSCOW TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, 
at 8; see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
PRIMER 43-45 (2003), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4171/04-25-ClimateChange.pdf. 
 244. Estonia, for example has seen reductions of 50.8% since 1990, Latvia a reduction of 
58.5%, and Lithuania 66.2%; of the so-called former satellite states, the Czech Republic 
reduced by 24.3%, Hungary by 31.9%, Poland by 32.1%, and Slovakia by 28.2%.  See Annual 
European Community Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2001 and Inventory Report 2003, 
Submission to the UNFCCC Secretariat, European Environment Agency (May 27, 2005) 
[hereinafter Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Inventory Report]. 
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trading scheme, as it would have credits to sell to other countries 
requiring higher emissions.245 
Several other countries under consideration are successfully on 
track to fulfill the treaty provisions and the country-specific targets of 
Kyoto.  The three big economic and political players of Europe—
Britain, France, and Germany—are on a trajectory to meet their 
targets.  Britain’s pollution is 13.3% less than the base year, France’s 
is 1.9% less, and Germany’s 18.5% less.  In the last couple of years, 
emissions in these three countries have increased, in part because of 
increases in coal-generated power production.  Nonetheless, these 
countries are on track to meet their 1990 levels.246 
Not every country that has ratified the treaty has projected a 
fulfillment of provisions.  Canada, which ratified on December 17, 
2002, increased its emissions by fifteen percent between 1990-1999.  
Even with climate change initiatives in place, Canada would still need 
to reduce emissions by nineteen percent to meet its Kyoto target.  
The likelihood that Canada will fail to fulfill the treaty provisions is 
not the result of neglect.  Since it agreed to participate in Kyoto, 
Canada has committed billions of dollars and substantial government 
energy to develop clean fuel technologies and encourage individuals 
and industry to reduce emissions.247  Reducing emissions while 
undergoing economic and population growth has proven to be an 
insurmountable challenge for Canada, which nonetheless appears to 
be committed to the objectives of the treaty.248 
Australia appears to have recognized the difficulty and economic 
impracticality of ratifying the treaty and, as a result, has not done so.  
 
 245. Russia is the largest source of emissions credits due to its industrial collapse in the early 
1990s.  Patrick Brethour and Steven Chase, Ottawa Eyes Pricey Kyoto Credits, GLOBE AND 
MAIL, Feb. 1, 2005, at A1. 
 246. These countries that are meeting their requirements have been offsetting the higher 
emissions of EU countries such as Spain, which exceeds its 1990 targets by 40.6%, and Portugal, 
which is over by 36%.  Overall, the EU is still meeting its targets.  See European Environment 
Agency, http://reports.eea.eu.int/eea_report_2005_8/en/GHG2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 
2006). 
 247. Canada has also invested $500 million as part of its Action Plan 2000 on Climate 
Change, which includes investment for new energy sources, adaptation research, and a better 
understanding of the science underlying climate change.  See generally the Canadian 
Government’s website on the Action Plan, Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for 
Honouring our Kyoto Commitment http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/kyoto_commitments/ 
c2.asp#s4 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
 248. National efforts to reduce emissions are captured in the state’s National 
Communications submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
CANADA’S THIRD REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/natc/cannce3.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
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Australia, like Canada, has dedicated funding towards limiting and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but “the Government also 
decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless and until it is 
demonstrated that it is in the national interest to do so.”249  Its 
government considered that its reliance on cost-effective energy in 
the form of fossil fuels, combined with the need to produce energy 
intensive resources for export, has made substantial emissions 
reductions counter to the nation’s economic interests.  Until cost-
effective alternatives can be found, Australia has indicated it will not 
be in a position to ratify.  Nonetheless, Australia is committed to 
funding research for alternative energy sources.250 
The United States has also chosen not to ratify Kyoto.  Following 
the 1997 negotiated agreement in Kyoto, several U.S. senators 
asserted their interest in expeditiously submitting the treaty for 
ratification, knowing that the treaty would be voted down.  President 
Clinton knew he could not obtain two-thirds majority in the Senate, 
but signed the treaty in November 1998.  The Senate then voted 
against the treaty, and President Bush sealed Kyoto’s fate by rejecting 
the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, later stating that the Protocol 
would have “wrecked the American economy.”251  The United States 
has recognized the problem of climate change and committed 
resources to better understanding the science behind it as well as 
alternative energy sources, spending $1.7 billion on federal research 
annually and providing $1 billion in climate change assistance to 
developing countries over the last five years.252 
 
 249. Australia’s Third National Communication on Climate Change parallels that of 
Canada’s and the other parties to the UNFCC, laying out the government’s commitment to 
emissions reductions and enumerating the different ways that the government supports the 
objectives of the treaty, whether through institutional investment or funding for research.  
Australia has demonstrated its commitment to the treaty through a wide variety of government-
sponsored activities.  See AUSTRALIA’S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/natc/ausnc3.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRALIA]. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Though President Bush has recently acknowledged the human contribution to global 
warming, he continues to criticize the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, preferring technological 
solutions rather than mandatory reductions, which he maintains would be a detriment to the 
American economy.  See Caroline Daniel & Fiona Harvey, Bush Admits to Role of Humans in 
Global Warming, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at 8. 
 252. The United States, one of the few Annex I countries that has not ratified the treaty, has 
been much maligned for its failure to do so.  The government, however, asserts its commitment 
to the treaty and outlines its policies for reducing emissions.  See DEP’T. OF STATE, U.S. 
CLIMATE THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
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State behavior regarding Kyoto and the motivations for that 
behavior have been variable.  Certain adherence behavior is readily 
explicable.  India, Brazil, and China had every reason to ratify the 
treaty, since doing so made them appear to be good global stewards 
while not subjecting them to emissions reductions.  Russia and 
Ukraine also have obvious reasons for ratifying and fulfilling the 
provisions.  Since they experienced precipitous economic declines 
after 1990, the base year used for Kyoto targets, they are in a position 
to gain from any emissions trading scheme, as they would have extra 
credits to sell, potentially amounting to $3 billion as part of an 
emissions trading system.253  No institutional investment or domestic 
embedding is required for these countries to meet their targets.  This 
set of countries is clearly rationalist, receiving the reputation benefits 
of signing without undergoing any negative economic impacts 
associated with implementation of alternative energy sources. 
Australia and the United States have also made decisions based 
largely on cost-benefit, realist calculations, but have cited different 
aspects of the calculations.  Australia has argued that its energy 
export business requires a disproportionately large amount of energy 
so it can provide energy to other countries with a lower capacity to 
produce.  The government has argued that “[b]y providing the world 
market with energy-intensive products and less greenhouse-intensive 
energy sources such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), Australia 
displaces emissions that would otherwise occur in these markets.”254  
The demand for fossil fuels is compounded by the decision not to use 
nuclear energy and by insufficient availability of the type of water 
needed for hydro-electric energy.  Given these calculations, Australia 
has determined that the treaty runs counter to its “national interest,” 
as defined by economic interest, and will not ratify it.255 
The United States is also concerned about the impact to its 
economy, from both an absolute and relative perspective.  Given its 
 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ 
ResourceCenterPublicationsUSClimateActionReport.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 253. The EU had realized that Kyoto would only enter into force if either Russia or the 
United States ratified the treaty.  Understanding that the United States was unlikely to sign, the 
EU enticed Russia with WTO accession, to which it responded positively.  WTO membership 
along with an emissions trading scheme beneficial to Russia ultimately convinced the Russian 
government that it should ratify Kyoto.  For the business side of Kyoto from the perspective of 
Russian ratification.  See John Carey, Russia’s Path to Kyoto, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2004, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2004/nf2004101_3878_db039.htm. 
 254. AUSTRALIA, supra note 249, at 2. 
 255. Id. 
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heavy reliance on fossil fuels, the U.S. government has argued that 
committing to reduce its energy consumption or to consuming 
alternative sources would have negative repercussions on the 
economy.  President Bush, in citing Kyoto’s flawed emphasis on 
emissions reductions rather than technology solutions as a basis for 
his opposition, asserted: “I don’t see how you can be president of the 
United States and agree to an agreement that would have put a lot of 
people out of work.”256  The U.S. Government has been wary of a 
treaty associated with potential negative economic consequences.257 
Any assessment of the absolute effect on America’s economy is 
usually associated with the point that some of the U.S. competitors, at 
least those in the future, are not also subject to fossil fuel reductions.  
Specifically, India and China are among the world’s largest emitters, 
but they have been exempted from the Kyoto requirements.  
Defending the American criticism of Kyoto, President Bush noted, 
“These and other developing countries that are experiencing rapid 
growth face challenges in reducing their emissions without harming 
their economies.”258  Exemption for countries that are among the 
largest emitters is thought to be unfair, putting a disproportionate 
share of the responsibility and cost on developed countries.  Realist 
interest in maintaining a strong economy, particularly relative to 
potential competitors, is clearly at stake. 
Implicitly, the U.S. behavior is also explained by the hypotheses 
laid out by hegemonic stability theory.  Adherence to Kyoto, given 
current U.S. emissions, would require dramatic changes to the 
domestic energy infrastructure; the perceived inconvenience and cost 
to meeting emissions reductions is thought to be high, leading the 
United States to oppose the treaty.259  Related to the realist 
 
 256. Daniel & Harvey, supra note 251, at 14.  See also Bush arrives at Summit Session, Ready 
to Stand Alone, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005 at A14. 
 257. Press Release, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html 
 258. Id. 
 259. The United States Department of Energy has evaluated the potential costs of fulfilling 
its Kyoto obligations.  In its section called Comparing Cost Estimates for the Kyoto Protocol, the 
study reports the following: “The estimates of unavoidable (irreducible) losses—income losses 
that cannot be recovered—for the U.S. economy range from $32 billion (DRI Case 2) to about 
$62 billion (EIA) in 2010.  There are many frictions that can increase costs above the irreducible 
minimum.  These include business cycles, international trade and capital constraints, regulation, 
use of imperfect instruments instead of auction permits, coal subsidies, CAFE standards, 
exemptions, efficiency losses from taxation, etc.”  ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
COMPARING COST ESTIMATES FOR THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
oiaf/kyoto/cost.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
03__AREND.DOC 8/1/2006  3:02 PM 
400 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:331 
explanations, the United States is also concerned with maintaining 
primacy and not being disproportionately constrained compared to 
possible competitors.  Concern with relative power and unrivaled 
primacy are important U.S. policy objectives.  The United States has 
made it clear that it will develop policies around those objectives, thus 
ruling out policies that give any advantage to potential rivals.260 
The treaty status in light of non-ratification of the United States 
also confirms hegemonic stability predictions that a treaty will be the 
most effective if it has the sponsorship and backing of the hegemon.261  
While the Kyoto Protocol has technically entered into force because 
of Russia’s ratification, it arguably still lacks teeth.  Not only are India 
and China not subject to the provisions of the treaty, but the United 
States, which leads in emissions, is not a party.  The treaty is 
substantively less effective without the main emissions contributor, 
and it is also less diplomatically effective.  U.S. ratification would give 
the Convention more leverage to bring developing countries on 
board, and it would give the United States an opportunity to use its 
leadership to that same end.  Instead, the United States has withheld 
its support, an act, which undermines the treaty’s effectiveness, but 
which may ultimately cause the UNFCC to create a solution that 
takes U.S. interests into account and that will garner U.S. 
endorsement.262 
While realist and hegemonic principles readily explain the 
previous countries, they are less helpful in explaining the behavior of 
European states such as Britain, France, and Germany.  These 
 
 260. The 2002 National Security Strategy outlines the U.S. foreign policy objectives and 
strategies that will be used to meet these objectives.  The document states that the highest 
priority is to defend the United States, which it can do best through “unparalleled strength” and 
the dissuasion of future military competition, and the maintenance of defenses beyond 
challenge.  See Section IX. Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the 
Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century, NSS 2002, at 30. 
 261. Gilpin has discussed the influence of the hegemon on international order and stability, 
using the examples of Britain and the United States to argue that the hegemon creates and 
enforces international rules.  Kindleberger has also written on the importance of a hegemon in 
promoting international stability.  Keohane has argued that the hegemon is important in 
facilitating the creation of an international regime but may not be as important in the 
perpetuation of that regime.  See KEOHANE, supra note 50. 
 262. At a press conference jointly held with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on July 7, 
2005, President Bush noted: “Now is the time to get beyond the Kyoto period and develop a 
strategy forward that is inclusive not only of the United States, but of the developing nations, 
and, of course, nations like Great Britain.”  George Bush, U.S. President, Bush, Blair at G8 Call 
for Post-Kyoto Strategy on Climate Change, Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister 
Blair at the 2005 G8 Summit in a Photo Opportunity (July 7, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Jul/08-375773.html). 
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countries might be associated with mixed motives, a combination of 
realist, constructivist, and modified structural realist behavior.  The 
European powers, particularly the United Kingdom, have enjoyed 
greater energy consumption, increases in use of independent means 
of transportation, and stronger economic growth, but still have been 
able to reduce emissions.  The difference has been a concerted 
interest in lowering emissions, and a strong government commitment 
to greater energy efficiency, pollution control measures in the 
industrial sector, and a general restructuring of the energy supply 
sector, with an emphasis on alternative energy sources.263  These 
policies have increased the efficiency of energy usage, a positive 
economic advantage and a positive result according to rationalist 
cost-benefit calculations. 
Adherence behavior, however, appears to be motivated by more 
than just rationalist calculations.  It seems to have an identity 
component, particularly for the United Kingdom.  The British 
government consistently asserts its engagement in the climate change 
debate, and its role in leading in international negotiations, and 
working towards a solution to the global problem.264  There is a sense 
that Britain conceives of itself as a global steward, leading in the goal 
of global sustainable development.  During the G8 Summit in July of 
2005, hosted by Great Britain in Gleneagles, Scotland, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair made climate change one of the two major issues on the 
agenda.265  Despite the terrorist attacks in London that occurred 
during the meeting, Blair returned to this issue in his press conference 
following the Summit.266  From a constructivist perspective, Britain’s 
 
 263. The United Kingdom’s Third National Communication under the UNFCC captures the 
policy changes responsible for emissions reductions, and the ideological commitment to 
addressing climate change.  U.K.’S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, available at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/ environment/climatechange/pubs/3nc/pdf/climate_3nc.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2006). 
 264. Id. at 5. 
 265. The other was aid to Africa. 
 266. Blair explained: 
What I wanted to do therefore at this summit was establish the following, and I believe 
we have done this.  I wanted an agreement that this was indeed a problem, that climate 
change is a problem, that human activity is contributing to it, and that we have to 
tackle it; secondly, that we have to tackle it with urgency; thirdly, that in order to do 
that we have to slow down, stop and then in time reverse the rising greenhouse gas 
emissions; and finally, we have to put in place a pathway to a new dialogue when 
Kyoto expires in 2012.  And what we have agreed is a dialogue between the G8 
countries and others, but most particularly the five that came to Gleneagles yesterday, 
and that dialogue will be on how we confront and tackle this problem.  It is combined, 
in addition, with a specific plan of action in respect of all the main issues, and that plan 
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strong adherence to Kyoto may reflect a deep-held belief that being a 
leader in promoting a greener world may mirror British identity. 
Defining itself as a leader for sustainable development may also 
be the result of modified structural realist constraints.  Since the 
United Kingdom is less powerful compared to its historic position as a 
world power, and has relied in recent years on U.S. power and 
security guarantee.  It has lost some of its global voice in security 
affairs, but has found it in other issues dealing with lower politics, 
including international development and environmental governance.  
Taking the lead on issues such as climate change has given Britain a 
voice opportunity that it may not have in the realm of high politics.267  
Britain uses the leadership role it is periodically offered, whether as 
the rotating President of the EU or the chair of a G8 meeting, to 
promote social and environmental responsibility.  It appears that the 
United Kingdom has determined that its influence in global affairs is 
best used in areas of low politics, and that it may relinquish leadership 
in the security arena to the United States. 
3. Validation of Theories.  In considering a general explanation 
for patterns of state adherence to Kyoto, no clear theoretical winner 
emerges.  On some level, where a state sits is where it stands.  The 
United States, as the hegemon, seeks to preserve its position and is 
unwilling to bind itself to a treaty that it considers disproportionately 
costly compared to potential rivals.  It is willing to hold out for a 
treaty that is more compatible with its interests, in part recognizing 
that a more effective treaty assumes hegemonic participation.  This 
behavior is also distinctly realist in that states do not want to sacrifice 
domestic autonomy and are cognizant of relative gains and losses vis-
à-vis other states.  Australia, in addition to the United States, fits into 
this category.  It should be noted that Australia may be an outlier to 
 
of action and the dialogue together will then be reported on, first of all at a meeting 
that will be held here in Britain on 1 November, and then in successive G8 
Presidencies.  And the President of Russia has kindly agreed to put this on the agenda 
for next year, and there will then be a full report back for the Japanese Presidency in 
2008. 
Tony Blair, U.K. Prime Minister, Presidency Press Conference at Gleneagles, (July 8 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7891.asp). 
 267. Robert Kagan addresses the different responsibilities of Europe compared to the 
United States, arguing that that Europe’s tacit reliance on the U.S. security guarantee has 
allowed European countries to consider the use of military force less often in favor of 
diplomacy.  One could make a similar argument about Europe’s ability to pursue issues of low 
politics compared to high politics.  See Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POLICY 
REVIEW 3 (2002), available at http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html. 
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the positional framework laid out in this Article.  The positional 
argument would suggest adherence on the part of Australia.  Instead, 
Australia has chosen not to ratify or adhere in any meaningful way to 
the provisions of the treaty.  While it is difficult to explain Australia’s 
behavior in light of the positional theory, it may be a case where its 
relationship to the United States has carried over into its actions. 
A second category includes states that require little sacrifice and, 
in fact, gain through emissions trading and are willing to adhere.  This 
category include states such as Russia, Ukraine, and other former 
Soviet Republics whose economies and emissions collapsed after 
1990, and that can meet their targets without changing their domestic 
status quo energy usage.  Structural realism would predict this 
behavior.  The rationale is, since there is no real sacrifice, why not be 
seen as a good state? 
The third category, primarily the three most powerful states in 
Europe, includes countries that have had to implement domestic 
energy restructuring in order to cut emissions, and have proceeded to 
do so.  These are countries that have made environmental 
conservation a priority and have, to some degree, enjoyed voice 
opportunities that they might not have garnered in the high politics 
arena.  Their behavior is best explained by a combination of modified 
structural realism and constructivism, that is, identifying themselves 
as environmental stewards. 
IV.  TOWARD A POSITIONAL THEORY OF ADHERENCE 
A. Traditional Theories and Adherence: A Failure 
As noted previously, both international relations scholars and 
international legal scholars have debated at length over whether and 
under what conditions states are likely to cooperate with 
international regimes and have applied several traditional theories to 
the issue.  Unfortunately, when each of those theories is tested 
through an examination of state behavior in the four treaty regimes 
examined here, none seems to be able to predict adherence across 
states.268  A realist approach explains some behavior—such as why 
India and Pakistan would not adhere to the CTBT.  But it does not 
 
 268. Professor Jack Snyder has similarly argued that “[t]heories of international relations 
claim to explain the way international politics works and each of the currently prevailing 
theories falls well short of that goal.”  Jack Snyder, One World, Rival Theories, 145 FOREIGN 
POLICY 52, 62 (2004). 
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explain other behavior—such as why the U.S. would neither sign nor 
ratify the CTBT and the Land Mine Treaty, but still adhere to many 
elements of those regimes.  Similarly, a modified structuralist 
approach might be able to explain why certain European states would 
seek voice opportunities in some regimes, but not why China would 
demonstrate any adherence behavior with respected to the CTBT.  
Neoliberalism would explain general behavior in the WTO, but not 
why the U.S. would follow some of the provisions of the Land Mine 
Treaty.  Hegemonic stability theory goes a long way in explaining 
U.S. behavior at the WTO and with respect to Kyoto, but not U.S. 
actions regarding the Land Mine treaty.  Perhaps constructivism 
could explain all behaviors described above, but that may simply be 
because constructivism in its current form allows for behavior that 
realists, modified structuralists, neoliberals, and hegemonic stability 
theorists would predict.  Needless to say, a theory that allows for all 
such behavior but cannot predict when such behavior will take place 
is quite problematic. 
In short, existing theories—as they are currently developed—fail 
to explain the textured adherence behavior that can be observed in 
these cases.  They may offer fruitful explanations of some state 
behavior, but cannot explain variances in state adherence behavior 
within the same treaty, or why the same state will adhere differently 
across different treaties.  As a consequence, a new theory of 
adherence is required. 
B. A Positional Theory of Adherence 
Our empirical work suggests that states’ approaches to 
international law are determined in part by where they stand in 
relation to other states in the international system and in part on the 
basis of other factors associated with each treaty.  If some of the 
insights of the traditional theories are linked to the position of the 
state, the contours of a new theory seems to emerge—what might be 
called “a positional theory of adherence.”  This theory relates the 
position of the state to four other factors: (1) the high/low nature of 
the regime; (2) the extent to which the regime infringes on state 
sovereignty; (3) the nature of the verification/enforcement 
arrangement of the regime; and (4) the normativity of the regime.  
This theory can be summarized for each of the positions that we have 
identified. 
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1. The Hegemon.  The global or regional hegemon is concerned 
with maintaining its position of primacy.  Doing so means not 
subjecting itself to any unfair disadvantages vis-à-vis challengers, 
being unfettered in its ability to defend itself, and being able to verify 
and enforce compliance on the part of other states.  It also means 
leveraging its power to influence institutions and parties in a way that 
returns benefits to itself.  To this end, the hegemon will be more 
likely to adhere to treaty in the area of low politics, with limited 
infringement on its autonomy, and with credible mechanisms for 
verification and enforcement. 
Ceteris paribus, a hegemon will be unlikely to adhere to a regime 
when there is weak normativity.  If there is no significant consensus 
behind the regime then it is unlikely that the state would demonstrate 
any elements of adherence.  The United States approach to the Kyoto 
Protocol seems to fall into this category.  Given the questions about 
the science underlying climate change, perceptions about the 
unfairness of the regime, and the unwillingness of other states to 
adhere, it is no surprise that the United States would be reluctant to 
sign, ratify or demonstrate any other indicators of adherence to the 
regime.  Conversely, if there is a stronger level of normativity, the 
global hegemon might be expected to demonstrate a greater level of 
adherence.  The Land Mine Treaty and the CTBT illustrate this 
behavior and are perhaps even more interesting.  In both cases, the 
United States has not ratified, but still adheres to many of the 
provisions of both treaties and has expressed strong support for the 
underlying purposes of the treaty regimes.  It seems that this behavior 
may be due to the strong sense of normativity of the regimes.  As 
noted earlier, land mines have come to be seen as “immoral, 
abhorrent” weapons by virtually all states in the international system.  
And there has always been a strong revulsion against nuclear 
weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.269  In other words, the moral 
efficacy of the regime would seem to pull the United States toward 
adherence. 
Different states may maintain the position of hegemon for 
different issue areas.  For example, on issues of high politics 
(security), the United States is clearly the hegemon and approaches 
international treaties accordingly.  On some issues of low politics, 
specifically in the economic realm, the European Union—whose total 
 
 269. See, e.g., TANNENWALD et al, supra note 75, at 433. 
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economy is about the size of the United States’270—is a hegemon and 
approaches international economic institutions accordingly. 
 
Assessing State Behavior: The Hegemon 
 
 CTBT 
Land 
Mine 
WTO Kyoto 
High/Low Politics Very High High Low Low 
Infringement on 
Sovereignty 
High Moderate Medium High 
Verification/ 
Enforcement 
Low Moderate High Low 
Normativity Medium High Uncertain Low 
Adherence Prediction Low Medium High Low 
2. The Partner.  Compared to states in other positions, global or 
regional partners tend to approach international treaties in the most 
adherent manner, almost irrespective of the issue area.  In many 
cases, they fall under the extended deterrence umbrella of the United 
States, a mechanism that mitigates the conditions of anarchy and 
allows them to pursue cooperation, whether in the area of high or low 
politics.  In the area of high politics, these states have been able to 
relinquish their pursuit of nuclear weapons development and can 
readily ratify non-proliferation agreements; in addition, their more 
limited global presence tends to mean that land mines are not a 
necessary element of their defense posture, making it easier for these 
states to adhere to the Land Mine Convention. 
Since their defense needs have been addressed by the American 
security guarantee, they may also be in a position to pursue 
cooperation issues in the area of low politics.  With the issues of 
relative gains mitigated by the security guarantee, they are in a 
position to harness the benefits of cooperation, including lower 
transaction costs, greater efficiency, and greater absolute gains across 
participants.  They may also perceive a regime’s normativity 
 
 270. For a useful comparison and projection of the European Union’s total economy vis-à-
vis the United States’, see, e.g., ADAM S. POSEN, THE BROOKINGS INST., FLEETING EQUALITY: 
THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE U.S. AND EU ECONOMIES TO 2020 (2004), available at 
http://www.brook.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/posen20040901.pdf.  If the analysis is correct and the 
EU’s economic power decreases vis-à-vis the United States, our theory would suggest that the 
EU would tend to approach economic treaties differently since it would no longer occupy a 
hegemonic position. 
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differently from the hegemon, seeking to adhere on the basis of a 
regime’s moral imperative (e.g., Kyoto) and perhaps driven less by a 
concern about relative fairness. 
Lastly, states in this category tend to be smaller and less powerful 
states that choose to exercise their influence through the “voice 
opportunities” afforded by participation in the treaty.  These 
countries may be able to lead the institution forward in a way that 
individually would be more difficult, which gives them additional 
incentive to participate in the treaty regime.  In keeping with these 
incentives for participation, partners—including the European 
countries, Canada, and Japan—seem generally to adhere to the 
regimes. 
 
Assessing State Behavior: The Partner 
 
 
CTBT 
Land 
Mine 
WTO Kyoto 
High/Low Politics Very 
High 
High Low Low 
Infringement on 
Sovereignty 
High Low Low High 
Verification/ 
Enforcement 
Low Low High Low 
Normativity Medium High Uncertain Low 
Adherence Prediction Highest Highest High High 
 
3. The Competitor.  According to the definition suggested 
earlier, a global or regional competitor harbors rivalries with other 
states but, depending on circumstances, may be able to reach higher 
levels of adherence.  Sovereignty issues are not as significant to these 
states as to the hegemon or adversaries, and normativity is less 
significant than for partners.  The key condition for cooperation 
appears to be confidence-building measures associated with the 
treaty’s objectives.  The case of Brazil and Argentina is the most 
instructive here.  Despite being historic competitors, they have 
realized that there is some utility in a Lockean state of cooperation, 
but the negotiations that have led to higher levels of adherence have 
occurred primarily on a bilateral basis outside the regime. 
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Within the regime, they are interested in enforcement and 
verification of the other participants, but are also concerned with 
fairness (normativity) and universalization of the treaties.  
Presumably, these concerns are driven by the residual 
competitiveness of the states; they are able to overcome their fear of 
anarchy but only under the condition that other states—primarily 
their competitor, but all states—are subject to the same constraints of 
the treaty.  They are willing to accept the terms of absolute gains, but 
only if other states are playing by those same rules.  In short, 
adherence is more tenuous with competitor states, but the right 
conditions can elicit cooperation. 
 
Assessing State Behavior: The Competitor 
 
 CTBT 
Land 
Mine 
WTO Kyoto 
High/Low Politics Very High High Low Low 
Infringement on 
Sovereignty 
High Low Low High 
Verification/  
Enforcement 
Low Low High Low 
Normativity Medium High Uncertain Low 
Adherence Prediction Medium Medium High Medium 
 
4. The Adversary.  Lastly, global or regional adversaries 
present the most pessimistic prospect for adherence, almost 
independent of the issue area, credibility of enforcement, and 
normativity; their goal is to maintain the highest possible degree of 
autonomy (lowest infringement on sovereignty) in order to defend 
themselves.  These states seem to exist in a Hobbesian world of 
constant distrust.  As a consequence, they will be less inclined to sign, 
ratify or adhere to the provisions of regimes that touch on issues 
relating to the rivalry.  Thus, Israel and its rival Arab states will not 
be inclined to adhere to the CTBT due to the belief that this 
agreement would unduly constrain behavior that might be necessary 
for their security.  The same can be said for India and Pakistan.  
Almost no amount of negotiation, confidence building, or certainty 
about enforcement can bring these states out of their constant 
security dilemma. 
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Since security is of paramount concern, a regime’s high degree of 
normativity would still exert little adherence pull with regard to these 
states.  They may simply be apathetic towards issues that may distract 
them from their goal of state survival.  Adversaries may be interested 
in economic cooperation, but only to the extent that it offers some 
instrumental utility and minimizes disadvantageous trade situations. 
 
Assessing State Behavior: The Adversary 
 
 CTBT 
Land 
Mine 
WTO Kyoto 
High/Low Politics 
Very 
High 
High Low Low 
Infringement on 
Sovereignty 
High Low Low High 
Verification/ 
Enforcement 
Low Low High Low 
Normativity Medium High Uncertain Low 
Adherence Prediction Lowest Lowest High N/A 
 
V.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF A POSITIONAL THEORY FOR 
FOREIGN POLICY 
What does this analysis mean for policymakers who design treaty 
regimes and seek the fullest and broadest adherence from states?  
How can they go about creating an effective regime that also brings in 
the hegemon and regional partners or competitors, takes into account 
principles of fairness, and mitigates concerns about relative gains and 
the security dilemma? 
A. The Hegemon 
First and foremost, the hegemon’s support is important to the 
development and sustainment of the treaty.  While not every treaty 
initiative must originate with the hegemon, obtaining the backing of 
the hegemon is important for several reasons.  First, the hegemon 
may be disproportionately responsible for the problem that the treaty 
addresses.  In the case of climate change, the United States accounts 
for 25% of greenhouse emissions.  Pragmatically speaking, the 
transnational problem of climate change requires the large 
contributors, which certainly includes the United States.  Second, the 
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hegemon has the ability to influence other states into supporting the 
treaty, both through its actions and through the incentives it offers 
other states.271  It may have more leverage than other states in the 
international system, positioning it to bring other states off the 
sidelines and into the treaty.  Third, the hegemon’s abstinence from 
the regime may at best be benign but at worst could actually 
undermine the regime.  Perhaps one of the most notable examples 
was America’s unwillingness to join the League of Nations following 
the First World War.  Without U.S. participation, the organization 
was doomed to be an ineffective collective security body. 
The hegemon’s support may be constructive to the regime, but 
presents a challenge to the policymakers developing the treaty.  On 
the one hand, it may benefit and preserve hegemonic power to 
project its influence through institutions, which creates an incentive 
for participation in the regime.272  On the other hand, as the accounts 
of hegemonic activity suggest, the hegemon’s desire to maintain 
primacy may impede its participation in particular regimes.  A 
hegemon that perceives the regime as antithetical to its security or 
economic interests will be less inclined to ratify, and the international 
community may not have the power to coerce ratification, as it might 
with smaller states.  Several options exist in this case.  The 
international community could wait for the right composition of 
domestic political actors.273  It may do nothing, hoping that the treaty 
will be sufficiently effective without the U.S. support, which is largely 
what the UNFCC has done with regard to Kyoto.  The international 
community may also choose to take the hegemon’s reservations into 
account in a modified treaty, as in the Law of the Sea, where states 
 
 271. Hegemonic international law claims that “in terms of the formation of customary law, 
such a power can by its abstention prevent the emerging rule from becoming part of custom.”  
Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 847 (2001).  A similar 
case could be made for the hegemon’s behavior with respect to treaty law: abstention, or 
conversely, participation, can influence the broader rejection or acceptance. 
 272. Some scholars have argued that the United States has created an “institutional 
bargain” with secondary states, in which the United States provides public goods, largely 
through institutions, in exchange for acquiescence from potential challengers.  In this 
framework, the participation and leadership in regimes serves to preserve the power and 
primacy of the hegemon.  See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY passim (2001). 
 273. Since the last opportunity for ratification of the CTBT was defeated only by a vote of 
51-48, ultimate ratification by a different political composition within the Senate might be 
plausible.  Alternatively, it may also suggest an isolationist undercurrent in U.S. foreign policy 
in which the United States retrenches rather than engages the international system.  See, e.g., 
Gerard Baker & David Buchan, American Isolationism Put to the Test: Rejection of the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty Demonstrates How World Issues are Pushed to the Fringe of U.S. Politics, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at 23. 
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recognized that without U.S. support, the treaty would largely be 
ineffective.  Alternatively, the hegemon may circumvent the treaty 
and create a separate multilateral regime designed to effect similar 
change, but through different means, as the United States has done 
with its climate change initiative.  Ideally, the hegemon would support 
in the development, adherence, and enforcement of the regime.  In 
less than ideal situations, the community may find itself resorting to 
these other policy options. 
B. Partners, Competitors, and Adversaries 
One of the most prominent adherence patterns to emerge 
throughout this analysis is that countries act in concert with regional 
partners, competitors, or adversaries.  This pattern presents several 
implications for policymakers hoping to gain the broadest 
participation.  Some regions, such as Europe, appear to have 
overcome the impediments to effective cooperation.  The behavior of 
those states suggests that they are not driven by relative gains but 
rather by the absolute gains of cooperation.  At least temporarily, 
they have been able to mitigate the security dilemma and act in 
concert toward early ratification and continuing adherence behavior.  
European states benefit individually from absolute gains but also 
collectively from the voice opportunities they attain from 
participation in regimes, so their adherence is rational and beneficial 
to the strength of the regime.  That said, European support alone is 
not the necessary and sufficient condition for global regime strength. 
Policymakers should recognize that the condition of anarchy 
creates challenges for cooperation in most countries, particularly 
states that are not global great powers, but are regional competitors.  
Brazil and Argentina have traditionally vied for regional hegemony in 
South America. Israel, Egypt, and Iran vie for regional hegemony in 
the Middle East; and India and Pakistan in south Asia.  Unless these 
regional competitions can be addressed, the limits to cooperation—at 
least in the security arena—will be prohibitively high.  As indicated 
previously, Brazil and Argentina have worked bilaterally to overcome 
some of those limitations at the multilateral level, but other states are 
still too steeped in recent competition to benefit from fruitful 
cooperation.  Policymakers must somehow break or at least mitigate 
the security dilemma of these regions if they intend to improve 
adherence, particularly in the security arena. 
Developing adherence pull is the most difficult with regard to 
adversarial states.  Although institutions are meant to increase 
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transparency, these states are often bound by the security dilemma to 
be convinced of any benefits of cooperation.  Having said that, one 
way to build confidence in the regime is to create a more robust 
transparency, verification, and enforcement regime, which might help 
mitigate the security dilemma by exposing the motivations and 
activities of their adversaries.  Israel has maintained that its non-
adherence to regimes such as the CTBT stems from its skepticism in 
the transparency of other states’ behavior and in the enforcement 
regime in general.  One way to build confidence in the enforcement 
might be to continue to fortify the IMS, which would require 
additional funds for international monitoring stations, but might 
increase the credibility of the regime’s transparency and regime. 
Another option for addressing the regional security dilemma is 
through hegemonic leadership, which presupposes hegemonic 
support for the regime itself.  If the United States were to support the 
CTBT, for example, it might use its leverage and influence to create 
separate side payments in exchange for the ratification by India and 
Pakistan.  Offering its satellite reconnaissance as a confidence 
building measure, creating economic incentives, and tying adherence 
to resource transfers might be effective ways of gaining participation 
from these states and perhaps breaking the adherence deadlock 
within the region.274 
In sum, different states’ positions will create different challenges 
for policymakers hoping to gain the broadest levels of adherence.  
Thus understanding a state’s position and motivations may help 
inform efforts to draft a treaty likely to elicit adherence.  In this sense, 
the fairness principle is very much linked to the way positions 
motivate state behavior.  States’ conceptions of fairness will be based 
in part on how they perceive the treaty to affect others vis-à-vis 
themselves.  In other words, fairness is relative, assessed by one state 
relative to its partners, competitors, or adversaries.  A treaty that 
disproportionately impacts Pakistan compared to India may be 
perceived by India to be unfair even if at the same time the treaty 
favors Brazil, which would have no impact on India’s influence in 
 
 274. In the recent agreement on civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United 
States, the United States acknowledged India’s status as a nuclear weapons power and agreed to 
transfer nuclear technology to India in exchange for India agreeing to accept additional 
inspections and tighter nuclear controls.  If the U.S. itself were more committed to the CTBT, it 
could easily have tacked the CTBT onto the bilateral exchange, and worked in parallel with 
Pakistan to gain their commitment to the regime.  See, e.g., Caroline Daniel & Demetri 
Sevastopulo, Nuclear Deal with India Spells Division in Washington, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2005, 
at 10. 
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south Asia.  Similarly, the United States’ concern with China’s global 
position suggests that the United States will consider fairness and its 
own adherence in part vis-à-vis China’s behavior.  Fairness as judged 
from the vantage point of a state’s position in the international or 
regional system is indeed a real concern for states evaluating their 
adherence policies and must fall squarely on the agenda of 
policymakers constructing international treaty regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted at the outset, the purpose of this Article has been to 
explore the motivations of global and regional powers regarding their 
adherence behavior toward four major treaty regimes.  We believe 
that this examination has demonstrated that a new theory, what we 
have called a “positional theory of adherence,” provides a more 
textured explanation of state behavior than the traditional theories of 
international relations and international law.  In particular, we 
believe that this study leads to several conclusions. 
First, state adherence is not an either/or proposition.  Rather, 
there is a spectrum along which adherence takes place.  Even some 
states that do not sign or ratify an international agreement may 
nonetheless demonstrate various levels of adherence to the treaty 
regime.  This is a fact that much of the “compliance” literature seems 
to miss. 
Second, while there is no scientific method for determining the 
precise level of adherence, there do seem to be a number of factors 
that can be used to evaluate the nature of adherence.  These factors 
include the extent to which the state follows the provisions of the 
agreement, the degree of institutional investment, the domestic 
embedding of the treaty provision, the willingness to accept dispute 
settlement procedures, and the extent of participation in any 
conferences or negotiations that relate to the agreement. 
Third, even though all traditional theories of international law 
and international relations are able to explain some state behavior 
some of the time, none succeed in explaining state behavior across all 
four treaty regimes examined in this article.  A positional theory 
hypothesizes that adherence behavior can be understood by 
examining the position of a state in the global or regional system as it 
relates to the nature of the regime, the degree to which the regime 
infringes on sovereignty, the verification/enforcement arrangements 
of the regime, and the normativity of the regime.  While this theory is 
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not perfect275 and still requires further development, we believe that it 
offers a great advance over previous approaches to compliance. 
Fourth, a positional theory has important implications for 
policymakers.  With an understanding of what motivates states in 
different positions, policymakers will be better equipped to determine 
which diplomatic levers to pull if they seek to secure state adherence 
to a particular regime. 
Fifth, by selecting treaties in the area of high and low politics, 
with higher and lower levels of infringement on sovereignty, 
verifiability, and normativity, we believe we have represented the 
different types of treaties in the international system.  As such, we 
suggest that the methodology used herein can readily be applied to 
other treaties to better understand the motivations and propensity for 
different states’ adherence behavior.  This analysis therefore provides 
a methodological framework that may be applied beyond the four 
treaties examined in this article, offering an analytical tool for both 
international relations and legal scholars.  It is our hope that scholars 
in both disciplines will be able to develop this theory further as they 
apply it to different treaty regimes and even customary international 
law. 
Finally, we believe that using official statements of policymakers 
has provided a useful method for understanding state motivation.  
The next step for subsequent research should involve the use of a 
variety of techniques to measure the motives for adherence.  While 
we have focused on public statements by decision-making elites, other 
scholars may have access to declassified materials, interviews of 
participants, and other sources to assess state motives.  As indicated 
earlier, while no method will be able to provide a perfect view into 
the minds of policymakers, the more lenses that a scholar uses, the 
more likely it is that a better picture of state motivation will be 
developed. 
 
 275. As noted earlier, Australia does not behave as the theory would predict with respect to 
the Kyoto Protocol.  As with any attempt to develop a theory of state behavior regarding 
international legal regimes, the more cases that are examined using this approach, the more the 
theory can be refined.  For a more detailed discussion of methodology and the refinement of 
theory, see GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY 25 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994). 
